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Abstract
The Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) Medicaid expansion is unique in terms of expanding coverage
to adults without dependent children (“childless adults”) and increasing community-based
outreach to raise awareness about coverage options. This dissertation explores the labor market
and outreach effects of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion on childless adults and parents,
respectively.
First chapter of the dissertation investigates the pre/post labor market implications of the
ACA’s Medicaid expansion for a population near the income eligibility cutoff. Using an arguably
exogenous variation at this cutoff, I find that Medicaid enrollment increases for childless adults.
This leads to an employment transition from full-time (≥35 Hrs) to part-time employment (<35
Hrs) after the expansion. The employment transition is mainly driven by the increase in
employment for working less than 20 hours. These findings support the presence of employment
lock – individuals who are employed primarily to retain health benefits. Replication of existing
studies that used difference-in-differences (DD) models with expansion states as the treatment
yield no employment effects. The treatment group in these models, however, is large and
heterogeneous.
In the second chapter, I assess the effect of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion on the retirement
decision of low-income adults aged 55 to 64 years. This chapter also focuses on childless adults, a
group that gained access to Medicaid coverage after the ACA. Using an instrumental variables (IV)
model that exploits both the expansion decision of states and timing, I find that the probability of
retirement increases by 14.8 percentage points for childless adults with Medicaid. The probability
of retirement increases by 13.4 and 16.1 percentage points for men and women, respectively.
In the last chapter, I show the effect of information on Medicaid enrollment of
previously-eligible parents (“woodwork effect”). Previous studies that analyze the changes in
Medicaid take-up often ignore potential outreach effects. After controlling for the change in
income eligibility limits, I find that woodwork effects are stronger in hard-to-reach communities
that consist of low-educated, Hispanic, and non-white parent groups. In addition, woodwork
effects increase enrollment in non-expansion states, particularly in states that have high search
volume of Medicaid. Overall, the findings support the presence of information spillovers under
the ACA’s Medicaid expansion.
Chapter 1
Does Medicaid Expansion Affect Employment
Transitions?
1.1. Introduction
The Affordable Care Act (ACA), also known as Obamacare, was passed into law by President
Barack Obama on March 23, 2010. The ACA enacted major provisions on private and public
health insurance to improve the health care status quo in the United States. In order to increase
the quality and affordability of health insurance among low-income adults, the ACA proposed a
nationwide expansion of the income eligibility limits to 138% of the federal poverty level (FPL).
In 2012, however, the Supreme Court found this provision to be unconstitutional, and allowed
states to opt-out of the program. Although the Supreme Court’s decision was viewed as a major
block to the ACA’s goal on reducing the uninsured rate, most of the adults were able to gain
coverage with the ACA’s Medicaid expansion in 2014 (Frean, Gruber, and Sommers, 2017).
The literature has provided an extensive set of studies that investigated the impact of earlier
3
Medicaid expansions on health outcomes1 and fiscal measures2. An important phenomena that
gained more attention in recent years is the “employment lock”, i.e., individuals working primarily
to secure private health insurance.3 A Medicaid-induced income effect or “windfall” may affect
the labor market behavior of individuals by making the job search and/or reduction in working
hours less costly.4 In fact, the Congressional Budget Office estimated a reduction in the net total
of hours worked by around 1.5% to 2% from 2017 to 2024 due to the ACA’s Medicaid expansion
(CBO, 2014).
This paper provides a novel contribution to the literature by investigating all possible
employment transitions resulting from the ACA’s Medicaid expansion for a population near the
eligibility cutoff. The impact of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion on employment, observed as a
discontinuity at the cutoff, is captured by exploiting the changes in state eligibility rules for
non-elderly adults without dependent children (“childless adults”), a group that gained access to
Medicaid coverage after the ACA.5 The ACA’s Medicaid expansion is unique in terms of
outreach efforts that involve mass marketing campaigns. Previously eligible adults may come
out of the woodwork due to increased outreach, which is referred as the “woodwork effect” or
“welcome-mat effect” (Sommers and Epstein, 2011, Frean, Gruber, and Sommers, 2017, Aslim,
1Piper, Ray, and Griffin (1990) found that Medicaid coverage in Tennessee did not improve the use of prenatal
care, and there was no significant effect on birth outcomes including birth weight and neonatal mortality. Sommers,
Baicker, and Epstein (2012) found a strong evidence of a reduction in mortality, improved self-assessed health, and
access to care in three expansion states (see, also, ?). Using a randomized experiment, Baicker et al. (2013) showed
an improvement on health care utilization and self-assessed health after the public coverage expansion in Oregon.
2Fiscal pressures during recessionary periods and limited political clout among beneficiaries lead to some states
to forgo Medicaid expansion (Coughlin et al., 1994 and Hoadley, Cunningham, and McHugh, 2004).
3Using the loss of public coverage in Tennessee as a natural experiment, Garthwaite, Gross, and Notowidigdo
(2014) found an increase in employment that implies the presence of employment lock. Gooptu et al. (2016),
however, found no employment lock under the ACA’s Medicaid expansion. In addition, some of the studies
investigated employment lock with respect to retirement effects under the ACA (Gustman, Steinmeier, and
Tabatabai, 2016, Levy, Buchmueller, and Nikpay, 2016, Aslim, 2018).
4This outcome has been predicted by the economic theory of the allocation of time. Using a simple model of
leisure, home production, and work, Gronau (1977) showed that increases in income increases leisure, reduces work
in the market, and has no effect on home production.
5Following nine states have expanded eligibility for childless adults in 2013: Arizona (AZ), Colorado (CO),
Connecticut (CT), Delaware (DE), District of Columbia (DC), Hawaii (HI), Minnesota (MN), New York (NY), and
Vermont (VT).
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2017). Parents and children are excluded in this study due to prior eligibility and “woodwork
effects” that may bias the estimates on Medicaid enrollment and labor market outcomes.
A number of studies have explored the employment effects of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion.
These studies have found little to no effect on employment (see, for example, Gooptu et al.,
2016, Leung and Mas, 2016, Kaestner et al., 2017), while contradicting to the findings of Dague,
DeLeire, and Leininger (2017), Garthwaite, Gross, and Notowidigdo (2014), and Kim (2016) for
Wisconsin (WI), Tennessee (TN), and Connecticut (CT), respectively.6 The estimates for WI
and CT suggested a reduction in employment by 12 percent resulting from the public insurance
expansion, and an increase in employment by 6 percent in TN after a loss of public insurance
coverage.7 Duggan, Goda, and Jackson (2017), on the other hand, investigated the effects of
multiple provisions of the ACA on labor market outcomes. The results indicated that middle-
income individuals who are qualified for private insurance subsidies reduced labor supply.
Table 1.1 provides a comprehensive list of the recent studies and compares the findings with
respect to earlier Medicaid expansions for different adult groups.8 Although a couple of studies
have investigated the expansions in 1970s, I restrict the sample of studies to post-2010 to focus
on the impact of recent Medicaid expansions on employment.9 Table 1.1 shows that employment
effects of Medicaid expansion are mixed among adult groups with different signs and magnitudes.
In particular, studies that used differences-in-differences (DD) models with expansion states as
the treatment group found no employment effects (or limited effects) after the ACA’s Medicaid
expansion.
This paper distinguishes from prior studies on multiple aspects. First of all, I introduce
6Gooptu et al. (2016) also found no transition between part-time and full-time employment.
7Tuzemen and Nakajima (2014) supported the findings on employment lock using a general equilibrium model
that accounts for worker and firm heterogeneity in labor markets.
8I only select empirical studies that investigate the impact of Medicaid expansions on adults. The studies
related to the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) are not in the scope of this paper.
9Some of the earlier studies have focused on potential changes in work incentives when there is an increase in
Medicaid income thresholds (Yelowitz, 1995 and Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2001).
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an alternative quasi-experimental design that exploits an arguably exogenous variation at the
eligibility cutoff. The model incorporates the dichotomous treatment (i.e., Medicaid eligibility) as
a deterministic function of the relative distance to the income eligibility cutoff, which is centered
around 138% FPL.10 It has important gains with respect to internal validity by comparing adults
with similar observable characteristics around the income eligibility cutoff. This procedure is
shown to yield credible results as it is in a randomized experiment (see, for example, Battistin
and Rettore, 2008, Lee, 2008, Lee and Lemieux, 2010). Estimating the difference in discontinuities
between pre- and post-2014, mainly to eliminate contempraneous shocks, yields the policy effect.
This model is coined as “difference-in-discontinuities” in the paper.11 This is the first study to
use this approach to explore the employment effects of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion on childless
adults.
Secondly, the data set used in this study is from the Current Population Survey (CPS) between
January 2010 and July 2016 with more years of data in the post-2014 period than the existing
studies. Leung and Mas (2016) used the CPS between January 2010 and July 2015. Gooptu et al.
(2016) used the same data up to March 2015. The largest years of data used among these studies
are up to May 2016 by Kaestner et al. (2017). In addition, the existing studies have constructed
simulated eligibility using a single data source that has information on both household income
and outcome variables (see, for example, Cutler and Gruber, 1996, Gross and Notowidigdo, 2011,
Sabik et al., 2017). A major contribution of this study is the construction of simulated eligibility
using two data sets, March CPS and basic monthly CPS – the former has information on household
income and the latter on labor market outcomes for each month. This overcomes the issue of using
March CPS as the sole data source, which does not capture the monthly variation in eligibility
10The eligibility thresholds for childless adults living in DC and WI are 215% FPL and 100% FPL, respectively.
11Grembi, Nannicini, and Troiano (2016) used a similar empirical strategy to examine the impact of fiscal rules
on taxes and budget deficits. The difference-in-discontinuities model is also used in the health economics literature
(see, for example, Chay, Kim, and Swaminathan, 2010, Hu, Decker, and Chou, 2017).
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limits and outcome variables.12
Using a difference-in-discontinuities model, I find a statistically significant jump in Medicaid
enrollment at the income eligibility cutoff. This leads to an employment transition from
full-time (≥35 Hrs) to part-time employment (<35 Hrs) after the ACA’s Medicaid expansion.
The employment transition is mainly driven by the increase in employment for working less than
20 hours. Subgroups are heterogeneous with respect to their response to employment. The
estimates on employment transitions are robust to the inclusion of early expansion states,
increased bandwidths, and different functional forms of the running variable. Falsification checks
show no employment effects on non-expansion states. All of these findings imply the presence of
employment lock prior to the expansion.
I replicate existing studies that used difference-in-differences (DD) models with expansion
states as the treatment group. I use various samples that are not only comparable to the samples
used in this study, but also to the existing studies. The estimates of DD model suggest no
employment effects after the ACA’s Medicaid expansion. Large and heterogeneous treatment
groups may jeopardize the effect of ACA’s Medicaid expansion on employment. The use of
simulated eligibility measure, however, reduces these concerns by including a population that is
more likely to be affected by the expansion in 2014.
In what follows, Section 2 provides a brief background information about the Medicaid
program. Section 3 introduces the data, sample, and variables. The empirical strategy is
discussed in Section 4. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 concludes with a discussion.
12Indiana and Louisiana, for example, have increased their income eligibility limits on February 2015 and July
2016, respectively. In March CPS, all of the changes in eligibility limits are assumed to happen in March. If people
respond immediately after the expansion, this would lead to an underestimation of the effect.
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1.2. Background Information on the Medicaid Expansion
1.2.1. Information on Expansion States and Eligibility
Children, pregnant women, and low-income parents had access to Medicaid prior to the ACA.13
Medicaid also covered elderly and disabled adults who receive supplemental security income (SSI).
Non-elderly adults without dependent children (“childless adults”), however, were not covered by
Medicaid due to the strict eligibility categories prior to 2010. The ACA, however, successfully
eliminated categorical eligibility by allowing childless adults to access to care via Medicaid. Several
states have expanded Medicaid to childless adults before the enactment of the ACA. Sommers,
Baicker, and Epstein (2012) used the coverage expansions in Arizona (November 2001), Maine
(October 2002), and New York (September 2001), and showed that the expansions increase access
to care and reduce mortality for childless adults between 35 to 64 years of age.14
In the post-ACA period, states had the option to fully subsidize low-cost health insurance
plans to adults with incomes below 138% FPL, and partially subsidize those between 138 - 400%
FPL.15 The Supreme Court, however, ruled out the reform to be an obligation for states (Supreme
Court of the United States, 2012). Figure 1.1 depicts the expansion profile of states. As of July
2016, there were 32 expansion states and 19 non-expansion states. Wisconsin (WI) have a unique
case among non-expansion states – coverage is fully subsidized to adults with incomes below 100%
FPL under the BadgerCare program. In the following analysis, WI is treated as an expansion
state due to the high income threshold. On the other hand, there are major differences in state
characteristics among expansion states and non-expansion states (see Figure 1.1 for the geographic
13Medicaid eligibility thresholds for children and pregnant women, excluding CHIP, have varied between 100 -
133% FPL, whereas the cutoff have always been much lower for parents in non-expansion states (see Table 2.2).
14The authors, however, cautioned the readers about the external validity of their estimates because of limited
sample of three expansion states.
15The subsidies above the eligibility threshold are not uniform. Low cost-sharing plans are available for those
with incomes between 138 - 250% FPL.
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variation in expansion and non-expansion states). It is crucial to account for these differences in
order to disentangle the effect of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion on employment. This important
issue is further discussed in Section 3.3.
Table 2.2 summarizes the effective expansion date and the corresponding income eligibility
levels for both childless adults and parents in each state. As evident from the effective dates,
not all expansion states have expanded at the same time. In fact, seven states have expanded
Medicaid after the main expansion on January 2014.16 In addition, nine states have provided
health coverage to low-income childless adults in 2013.17 I have excluded these nine states in the
benchmark analysis to eliminate concerns on woodwork effects that may confound the estimates
on Medicaid enrollment and employment.18 The adults who were previously eligible might take-
up Medicaid after the information spillover under the ACA’s Medicaid expansion (Sommers and
Epstein, 2011; Sonier, Boudreaux, and Blewett, 2013).19 However, I probe the robustness of the
estimates to the inclusion of early expansion states.
Overall, the sample used in the analysis is composed of 23 expansion states with 138% FPL
eligibility for childless adults, one (expansion) state with 100% FPL eligibility for childless adults,
and 18 non-expansion states. An important issue regarding eligibility is whether individuals take
up coverage or not. Next section discusses this issue thoroughly using administrative data.
16Three recently adopting states are Alaska (AK), Montana (MT), and Louisiana (LA). The effective
implementation of the policy in AK is September 1, 2015. MT’s and LA’s effective implementation dates are
January 1, 2016 and July 1, 2016, respectively.
17Nine early expansion states are: AZ, CO, CT, DE, DC, HI, MN, NY, and VT.
18Leung and Mas (2016) excluded 13 states that had limited benefits in 2013, and their DD estimates are robust
to the exclusion.
19These concerns could be addressed if the researcher have access to information on health insurance prior to
2014. The current data set has limitations in observing Medicaid enrollment, and woodwork effects are not in the
scope of this paper.
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1.2.2. Medicaid Enrollment
It is important to explore the changes in Medicaid enrollment in order to understand the effect
of the reform on labor market outcomes. If eligible adults do not take-up Medicaid, it is not
possible to attribute the changes in labor supply to the ACA’s Medicaid expansion. The CBO
has predicted the increase in Medicaid and CHIP enrollment for newly eligible individuals to
be 13 million in 2016 with an increase to 16 million after 2019 (CBO, 2015).20 Prior to these
estimations on the effect of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion, the consensus in the literature with
respect to the participation of new eligible individuals was more than 10 million (Sommers et al.,
2012a). These estimates suggested a relatively high marginal take-up after the ACA’s Medicaid
expansion.21 Studies that simulated the effect of Medicaid expansion showed a reduction in the
number of under-insured people by 70 percent and the number of uninsured by 20 million after
the enactment of the ACA (Schoen et al., 2011, Parente and Feldman, 2013).
According to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), more than 73 million
enrolled for Medicaid and CHIP in July 2016 with a 28.72% enrollment growth rate relative to
the average of July - September 2013.22 There is an upward trend in the take-up rate of Medicaid
after 2014, which could be explained by increased outreach under the ACA (Frean, Gruber,
and Sommers, 2017). The earlier studies, on the other hand, showed modest take-up rates of
Medicaid prior to the ACA.23 Using the CPS from 2007 to 2009, for example, Sommers and
20Figure A1 shows the total enrollment growth rate of Medicaid and CHIP. Medicaid enrollment is higher in
expansion states relative to non-expansion states. The recent bending of the curve could be due to a possible
convergence to steady-state.
21It is important to distinguish between marginal take-up and average take-up under the ACA’s Medicaid
expansion. Marginal take-up refers to those who are newly eligible, whereas average take-up refers to all eligible
individuals.
22The numbers of enrolled are 51,557,834 and 21,909,593 in expansion states and non-expansion states,
respectively. The average enrollment in July - September 2013 and the enrollment in July 2015 exclude Connecticut
and Maine. The data could be accessed online through http://www.medicaid.gov.
23In previous studies, the estimates of average Medicaid take-up among adults ranged between 52% to 81.3%
prior to the ACA (Sommers et al., 2012a).
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Epstein (2010a) found the average take-up Medicaid rate to be 61.7%. Using the 2009 American
Community Survey (ACS), Kenney et al. (2012) found the average Medicaid take-up rate to be
67%. Although the national averages were relatively low prior to the ACA, Massachusetts have
managed to increase Medicaid average take-up rate to 80% after 2006 (Sommers and Epstein,
2010a). Massachusetts, however, reformed health care in 2006, which fully took place in mid-
2007, and has been viewed as a for model the ACA. These findings clearly suggest that health
care reforms that implement public coverage expansions are associated with increased (average
and marginal) take-up rates.
I use administrative data from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) through
the Medicaid Budget and Expenditure System (MBES) to analyze the average and marginal
take-up rate of Medicaid in the post-2014 period. Using the percent changes from January 2014,
Figure B2 shows that the average take-up rate is smoother than the marginal take-up rate. Newly
eligible enrollees are not only childless adults, but also those who were not eligible with the previous
income thresholds. In MBES data, it is not possible to distinguish between parents and childless
adults. Using the same data, Kaiser Family Foundation found the newly eligible enrollment for
Medicaid to be around 12 million in 2016. I further support this analysis by using a national
survey, the Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) of the CPS, to test whether there is
a discontinuity in Medicaid enrollment at the income eligibility cutoff for childless adults. These
findings are presented in Section 3.5.
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1.3. Data, Sample, and Variables
1.3.1. Data and Sample
The main data set used in the analysis comes from the basic monthly Current Population Survey
(CPS). Supplemental data sets on Medicaid enrollment and eligibility rules that vary by state and
year are obtained from the Kaiser Family Foundation and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services. The CPS monthly data contain all of the relevant variables on household demographics
and labor market outcomes. There is a multistage stratification for the sample households, where
a household is interviewed by 4 months consecutively, then followed by a 8 months break, and
finally they are interviewed for another 4 months. Most importantly, quick release of the data
allows researchers to analyze immediate impacts of a policy change.24
The sample period is from 2010 to July 2016 with more years of data after the expansion
in 2014 compared to the studies given in Table 1.1. As discussed earlier, the sample includes
24 expansion states and 18 non-expansion states. The remaining nine early expansion states are
dropped due to the confounding effects on Medicaid enrollment. Since the group of interest is
childless adults, I restrict the sample to those who do not have an own (and/or related) children
under the age of 18 living in the household. This reduces the sample size by 57.8 percent from
1,263,469 to 533,808 observations. Childless adults who are below 26 years of age could remain on
parent’s coverage through the ACA’s dependent coverage mandate25, and those who are above 64
years of age are qualified for Medicare. In addition, those who are in the armed forces are eligible
for HMO-type military health-care plans – TRICARE. In order to mitigate the potential bias
24An alternative data set is the American Community Survey (ACS), but the main limitation is the lagged
release of the data. As of the writing of this paper, the ACS only had one year of data for the post-expansion
period.
25Antwi, Moriya, and Simon (2013), on one hand, found an evidence supporting employment lock that results
from high take-up rates of parental coverage. Bailey and Chorniy (2016), on the other hand, found no evidence of
job lock, measured as job mobility, for young adults.
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resulting from dependent’s coverage, Medicare, and TRICARE, the sample is restricted to non-
institutionalized civilized adults who are aged 27 to 64.26 The sample size reduces from 533,808
to 315,522 observations, which is a 40.9 percent reduction. These are the two major restrictions
applied to the sample, which are common in existing studies (see, for example, Leung and Mas,
2016).
The household size is restricted to less than seven in order to prevent issues regarding multiple
families. The sample size reduces by 2,835 observations. The sample restrictions defined above are
also applied to the ASEC supplement (“March CPS”) when used for the simulation on eligibility.
The employment measures are constructed using the information on working hours. Note that 5
percent of the sample have varying working hours, which are coded as “hours vary”. For childless
adults who are working part-time and have varying working hours, I impute the weighted average
of those who work less than 20 hours and 20-34 hours. This weighted average is calculated to be
22.76 hours for childless adults who work part-time.
1.3.2. Eligibility Simulation
The most important component of simulated eligibility is household income given that eligibility
is a function of income.27 In order to simulate eligibility, I exploit the information on household
income given in March CPS. I use the sample between 2011 to 2013 in the March CPS, excluding
nine months before the ACA’s Medicaid expansion, to avoid any anticipated changes in household
income.28 The increase in income threshold to 138% FPL could create incentives to manipulate
household income to become eligible for Medicaid. In addition, the motivation behind using a
26Since an individual can remain on parent’s insurance plan until December 31 of the year he/she turns 26, it is
more accurate to have a sample starting from the age 27.
27When applying for Medicaid, step child, adopted child, foster child, brother, sister, niece, nephew, and
grandchild could be included in the household counting under the tax filer’s rules. In addition, non-relatives
who live for an entire year in the tax filer’s house could be claimed as tax dependents. Those who are claimed as
tax dependents are included in the tax filer’s household counting.
28The remaining sample restrictions are the same as those applied to the basic monthly CPS (see Section 1.3.1).
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sample after 2010 is to avoid any confounding effects of the Great Recession.29 The specification
used for the data generating process is defined as follows:
yitms = γ0 +X
′
iγ1 + τtm + τ
2
tm + ξs + τtm ∗ ξs + itms (1.1)
where y is household income for individual i at time tm (year and month) in state s.
30 X includes
cell blocks on age, race, gender, marital status, educational attainment, and household size.31
Linear time trend is captured by τtm and τ
2
tm is trend-squared.
32 State fixed effects are ξs, and
τtm ∗ ξs is an interaction that captures state-specific linear trends. The error term is . The
coefficients obtained from March CPS are used in the basic monthly CPS to get yˆitms, which is
denoted as the simulated household income (SHHIitms).
In order to determine eligibility for Medicaid, poverty thresholds provided in Table A1 are
used.33 Thus, the formula used to calculate simulated eligibility has the following first step:
Pitms =
SHHIitms
FPLts
× 100 (1.2)
where FPLts is the federal poverty level (FPL) that varies by year t and state s. The variables
in Equation (1.2) also vary by household size (h). For simplicity in notation, h is suppressed
hereinafter. Pihs is income as a percent of FPL for individual i at time tm (year and month) in
state s. The second step is constructed as follows:
29Based on the NBER Recession Indicators for the United States, the Great Recession spans the period between
December 2007 and June 2009 (see https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/USREC). Due to slow recovery and high
unemployment rates in 2010, I start the sample period as early as 2011.
30Note that household income could be negative due to accumulated debt.
31When simulating Medicaid eligibility, Golberstein and Gonzales (2015) use cells on age, sex, marital status,
number of children, race, and educational attainment.
32Note that linear time trend is defined for year-month pairs: τtm = {1, . . . , 79}.
33For example, 100% FPL in 2015 for a single household is $11,770 and 138% of FPL is $16,242 (see Table A1).
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Eitms = I{Pitms ≤ 138} (1.3)
where Eitms is eligibility and I{.} is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if Pitms ≤ 138 and
0 otherwise.34 This simulated eligibility measure accounts for both individual- and state-level
differences in household income by using state-specific rules for eligibility. A similar approach
is used by Dave et al. (2015) to capture the heterogeneity in the distribution of income using a
state-specific sample. Cutler and Gruber (1996) construct simulated eligibility using each cell of
observable characteristics for a nationally drawn sample and use it as an instrument for actual
eligibility.35 Pohl (2014) uses a similar simulated eligibility measure as a proxy for actual eligibility
rather than using the IV method due to concerns on inconsistent estimates. A major contribution
of this study is the use of two different data sets, March CPS and basic monthly CPS, to construct
simulated eligibility. This overcomes the issue of using March CPS as the sole data source, which
does not capture monthly variation in the changes in income thresholds and the outcome variables.
The running variable, ditms, is constructed by centering Pitms around zero. This is defined as
follows:
ditms = Pitms −Rs, (1.4)
where Rs is the state eligibility rule, which is 100% FPL for WI and 138% FPL for the
remaining expansion states. Although the sample used for the simulations reduces the
possibility of systematic manipulation, I probe the continuity of the running variable using the
density test proposed by McCrary (2008). Any non-random sorting around the cutoff biases the
34The indicator function is I{Pitms ≤ 100} for WI.
35There are many studies following the approach suggested by this study. Gross and Notowidigdo (2011) use
information on state, year, household income, number of children, and gender to construct Medicaid eligibility.
Sabik et al. (2017) use state, year, household income, and family size to construct Medicaid eligibiliy.
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estimates. Figure 1.2 clearly shows no evidence of systematic manipulation around the cutoff
prior to the policy.36 The preferred bandwidth is ±4% FPL, which is the largest bandwidth that
has smooth covariates around the cutoff. There is a tradeoff between sample size and covariate
smoothness: as bandwidth increases covariates are less smooth around the eligibility cutoff. The
preferred bandwidth in this paper is selected based on covariate smoothness and the largest
sample that is possible. I probe the robustness of the estimates to bandwidth selection.
Since self-reported income is a noisy measure and I impute household income (“SHHI”) using
Equation (1.1), the running variable (ditms) could be confounded by measurement error. In order
to reduce concerns on measurement error, I first employ a graphical analysis on percent Medicaid
enrollment around the percent income threshold and second I estimate the jump in Medicaid
enrollment around a ±4% FPL and ±8% FPL bandwidth. If eligibility is assigned incorrectly due
to measurement error, there would be no evidence of a jump in Medicaid enrollment. Figure 1.3
shows the average Medicaid enrollment within equally-sized bins. The vertical line corresponds
to 138% FPL. The figure shows that Medicaid enrollment converges to zero as income increases.
It is clear that Medicaid enrollment is higher below the income eligibility cutoff. The estimates
on Medicaid enrollment also show a positive and statistically significant jump at the income
eligibility cutoff (see Table 1.4). When preferred bandwidth is used in column (1), Medicaid
enrollment increases by 27.5 percentage points. The findings are robust to increasing bandwidths.
A detailed discussion on bandwidth selection is provided under robustness checks.
1.3.3. Descriptive Statistics
Table 1.3 provides descriptive statistics on outcome and control variables in expansion states for
both eligible and non-eligible adults defined by Equation (1.3). The sample is stratified by pre-
36There is also no evidence of discontinuity when the sample is not restricted to pre- and post-period.
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and post-2014 period to observe possible trends in outcomes. Panel A shows the mean of the
outcome variables including the employment measures. The total number of observations used in
the study can be calculated by adding the observations in each column. Given the bandwidth, full
sample size is captured by those who are in the labor force (N=4,140), and the remaining outcome
variables are sub-samples of those who participate in the labor force. The base group for labor force
participation includes adults who are not in the labor force. The variable on employed captures
the share of employed relative to unemployed (N=3,111). Part-time employment categories (<20
Hrs, 20-34 Hrs, and <35 Hrs) are relative to full-time employment (≥35 Hrs), and the variables
capture the working population around the cutoff (N=2,796). Note that the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) defines part-time employment as working less than 34 hours per week.
Before the policy change, part-time employment (<35 Hrs) is relatively higher for non-eligible
adults. With the ACA’s Medicaid expansion, there is a significant change in employment, where
eligible adults reduce working hours by transitioning into part-time employment (<35 Hrs) and
non-eligible adults increase full-time employment (≥ 35 Hrs) relative to part-time employment
(<35 Hrs). After all the employment transitions, part-time employment (<35 Hrs) increases
by 1 percentage point at the cutoff for eligible adults. The change in part-time employment
(<35 Hrs) is driven from the increase in employment of 20 working hours for eligible adults
that leads to a 2.9 percentage points difference relative to non-eligible adults. The decline in
the employment category for 20-34 hours of work also suggests that the dominating effect is the
increase in employment for the bottom portion of working hours – working less than 20 hours
of work. Both labor force participation and the share of employed increase for eligible and non-
eligible adults with the latter being greater in magnitude. Overall, eligible adults have higher
part-time employment (both <35 Hrs and <20 Hrs), and lower labor force participation and
share of employed relative to non-eligible adults. All of these changes support the presence of
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employment lock prior to the ACA’s Medicaid expansion.
Panel B introduces the control variables used in the benchmark model, which include both
individual- and state-level characteristics. Demographic characteristics are comparable among
eligible and non-eligible adults in the pre- and post-2014 period, respectively. The base group for
the variables on education is having a college education or more. Since educational attainment
is positively correlated with income, non-eligible adults have higher educational attainment than
eligible adults. All of the composition changes among eligible and non-eligible adults in the post-
period follow a similar pattern. When the average of a control variable increases (or decreases)
after the expansion for eligible adults, it also increases (or decreases) for non-eligible adults with
the exception of the category on separated adults.
After differencing out the composition changes in the pre- and post-2014 period, no statistically
significant jumps are observed around the income eligibility threshold. This is discussed further
under covariate smoothness test in Section 1.4.1. In addition, the changes in state unemployment
rate capture the spillover effects of the Great Recession. The state unemployment rate is obtained
by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and it is seasonally adjusted. On the other hand, state
GDP is a percent change from preceding quarters, which is measured in chained dollars. The data
on state GDP are publicly available through the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. Note that
state time-varying effects are crucial in terms of capturing macro-level differences in expansion
and non-expansion states.
The visual representation of discontinuities resulting from the policy change is illustrated in
Figure 1.4.37 The discontinuity plots are centered around zero and the running variable represents
the percent FPL relative to the cutoff. The scatter plot represents the mean of the outcome
variable within equally-sized bins and the fitted lines are local linear regressions using triangular
37Discontinuity plots are commonly used to support RD models to visually identify the policy effect (see, for
example, Carpenter and Dobkin, 2009, Card, Dobkin, and Maestas, 2009).
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kernel on both sides of the cutoff. The comparison of discontinuities is made for expansion
states in pre- and post-period of the policy. The test on discontinuities for non-expansion states
is conducted later as a falsification test. For the discontinuity plots, I focus on the transition
between part-time employment (<35 Hrs) and full-time employment (≥35 Hrs). The main policy
effect is captured by taking the difference in discontinuities.
The findings of discontinuity plots are similar to those shown in Table 1.3. Relative comparison
of the discontinuities suggests that part-time employment (<35 Hrs) increases relative to full-time
employment (≥35 Hrs) for those who are eligible for Medicaid after the ACA’s Medicaid expansion.
Moreover, this increase is mainly driven from the increase in the bottom portion of working hours,
which is working less than 20 hours.38
In the next section, I introduce the benchmark model that incorporates both simulated
eligibility and the variables introduced in Panels A and B of Table 1.3.
1.4. Methods
In this section, I present an RD model that takes the treatment as a deterministic function of
the covariate given the upward trend in the Medicaid take-up rate, which is further tested using
Medicaid enrollment in March CPS.39 The ignorability or unconfoundedness assumption holds
by design. This specification is preferred due to its strong foundation on internal validity by
comparing similar populations near the cutoff.40 A standard RD model is defined as follows:
38The discontinuity plot for 20-34 working hours does not show any significant increase for those below the
cutoff. This plot is available upon request.
39This paper does not use March CPS as the sole data source due to its limitations on constructing simulated
eligilibity (see Section 1.3.2). Note also that the questions on health insurance in March CPS are redesigned at the
time of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion and hence could bias the estimates on enrollment when used in a fuzzy RD
design.
40See Imbens and Lemieux (2008) for a detailed discussion on the use of RD models in economics.
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yitms = β0 + β1Eitms + g(d) + β2Eitms ∗ g(d) +X
′
itmβ3 + δm + γt + ξs + [ψtms] + vitms (1.5)
where y is labor market outcomes (and Medicaid enrollment) for individual i at year and survey
month tm in state s. Eitms is the simulated eligibility defined by Equation (1.3). The running
variable, denoted as d, is obtained through Equation (1.4). The center of d corresponds to 138%
FPL, which is normalized to zero. The functional form of d is captured by g(d) - linear, quadratic
and cubic functions. The robustness of the estimates with respect to the functional form of d is
tested in the results section. X is composed of control variables including age, age-squared, race,
gender, marital status, and educational attainment. The period effects, defined as month and
year effects, are δm and γt, respectively. State fixed effects are defined as ξs, and ψtms is state
timing-varying effects including the state unemployment rate and GDP growth rate.41 The error
term is vitms.
A standard RD model could show the discontinuity in expansion states after the policy change.
A possible discontinuity in both non-expansion states and expansion states in the pre-2014 period
could be solely treated as falsification checks. The visual illustrations of discontinuities, however,
in the expansion states show significant jumps in the pre-2014 period for some of the outcome
variables (see Figure 1.4).42 Thus, taking the difference in discontinuities accounts for possible
contemporaneous shocks that may vary by household income. Thus, Equation (1.5) is modified
by including “Post” interactions to difference out those possible contemporaneous shocks. This
model can be written as follows:
41Note that the time dimension of ψtms accounts for the monthly and quarterly variation in the unemployment
rate and GDP growth rate, respectively.
42These jumps are not due to any selection around the cutoff since this is checked in the paper through McCrary’s
manipulation test and covariate smoothness test.
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yitms =α0 + α1Eitms + g(d) + α2Eitms ∗ Posttms + α3g(d) ∗ Posttms
+α4Eitms ∗ g(d) ∗ Posttms +X
′
iα5 + δm + γt + ξs + [ψtms] + vitms
(1.6)
where Post varies by state (s), year and month (tm), and takes the value 1 after the expansion
date and 0 otherwise (see Table 2.2). The rest of the variables is the same as those discussed in
Equation (1.5). This is the benchmark model of the paper with β2, denoted as Eligibility ∗ Post
in the tables, being the coefficient of interest. This coefficient captures the change in labor
market outcomes at the eligibility cutoff before and after 2014. Since differencing out eliminates
contemporaneous shocks, any change at the cutoff is attributed to the ACA’s Medicaid expansion.
This discontinuity is expected to be statistically insignificant for non-expansion states since they
are not (directly) affected from the reform. For the benchmark model, the preferred bandwidth
is the largest that passes the covariate smoothness test, which is ±4% FPL. The relationship
between the potential outcomes and the running variable has to be smooth to interpret any
resulting discontinuity as the average treatment effect. The standard errors are bootstrapped
with 400 replications and clustered by state.43
In this paper, the validity of model assumptions and the robustness of the estimates are tested
using the following approaches: i) density test for the running variable d (discussed in Section
1.3.2); ii) covariate smoothness test around the eligibility cutoff; iii) testing the robustness of the
estimates to different bandwidths; iv) changing the functional form of the running variable; and
v) including early expansion states in the analysis.
43The findings are robust to increasing bootstrap replications. In addition, I exclude significance at 10 percent
to avoid any issues on sensitivity.
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1.4.1. Covariate Smoothness Test
It is crucial to test whether the population composition is similar around the eligibility cutoff
for a given bandwidth. Non-random sorting of a certain group near the cutoff may bias the
estimates on eligibility. The main motivation here is to show that there is no selection on either
side of the eligibility cutoff with respect to observable characteristics given in Table 1.3. If
observable characteristics are smoothly distributed around the eligibility cutoff, this would imply
that unobservable characteristics are also smoothly distributed around the eligibility cutoff. In
this case, the concerns on internal validity with respect to omitted variables would be reduced
and hence any discontinuity could be interpreted as the causal effect of Medicaid expansion.
In order to test for this formally, I run the regression model given in Equation (1.6) by changing
the outcome variables as the control variables. Since the policy is not effective in non-expansion
states, I examine the eligibility profile of demographic characteristics only in expansion states.
The findings, presented in Table 1.5, show no evidence of a discrete jump at the eligibility cutoff.
Thus, the preferred bandwidth is the largest bandwidth that passes the covariate smoothness test.
It is crucial to note that the increase in bandwidth still yields statistically significant employment
effects but there is a tradeoff in comparing similar individuals. This implies that sample size
increases as bandwidth gets wider but at the cost of failing the smoothness test for various
covariates. In cases of non-random sorting, it is not possible to claim that the sole factor causing
the jump is the ACA’s Medicaid expansion.
1.5. Results
This section provides the findings from the benchmark and subgroup analysis, covariate
smoothness test, robustness and falsification checks, and the DD model to replicate existing
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studies.
1.5.1. Benchmark Analysis in Expansion States
In this section, I focus on the estimates from Equation (1.6) for expansion states using Tables
1.4 and 1.6. In Table 1.6, each panel denotes a separate regression for the given outcome
variable.44 The estimates show no effect of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion on labor force
participation, the probability of being employed, and employment for 20-34 working hours. The
main effect, however, is observed as an employment transition from full-time (≥35 Hrs) to
part-time employment (<35 Hrs). In column (3), there is an increase in part-time employment
(<35 Hrs) by 13.7 percentage points relative to full-time employment. It is also evident that
employment (<20 Hrs) increases (9.4 percentage points) after the ACA’s Medicaid expansion.
The findings imply that the increase in part-time employment is mainly driven from the
transition between full-time employment and employment with less than 20 working hours. This
is consistent with the priori that adults who are experiencing employment lock will respond to
incentives created by the ACA’s Medicaid expansion. The main incentive is the Medicaid-induced
income effect that makes both the job search and/or employment transitions less costly.45 For the
remainder of the paper, I only focus on the most inclusive regression that has control variables,
year and month effects, state fixed effects, and state-time varying effects.
1.5.2. Subgroup Analysis in Expansion States
In this section, I explore the heterogeneity of employment effects across subgroups in expansion
states. Female and low-educated (HS or less) adults increase their employment (<20 Hrs) by 14
44As discussed earlier, part-time employment is a subgroup of adults who are employed, and those who are
employed are a subgroup of adults who are in the labor force. The total number of observations for each outcome
are denoted in Section 1.3.3.
45In addition, I do not find an increase in self-employment after the expansion. The findings on self-employment
are available upon request.
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and 21.1 percentage points, respectively. For adults who are married once, there is a relatively
stronger effect on part-time employment (<35 Hrs) with a statistically significant increase by
19.6 percentage points.46 The increase in part-time employment (≥35 Hrs) is again driven by
the increase in employment for working less than 20 hours (11.8 percentage points). This finding
is consistent with the benchmark analysis that shows a statistically significant increase in
employment for working less than 20 hours. This implies that subgroups respond to the ACA’s
Medicaid expansion by reducing working hours.
There is no evidence of a transition from employment to unemployment across subgroups.
In fact, the probability of being employed increases by 10.7 percentage points relative to the
probability of being unemployed for adults who are married once. There is also no evidence
of a discontinuity in labor force participation and employment for 20-34 working hours across
subgroups. There are no effects observed for males, high-educated adults (more than HS), and
never married adults. Additionally, there is no evidence of an employment effect for different
age groups (27-49 vs. 50-64). Overall, the employment effects are concentrated among females,
low-educated adults (HS or less), and adults who are married once.
1.5.3. Robustness and Falsification Checks
The first robustness check is on including early expansion states in the sample. Since the analysis
excludes relatively large states, I test whether the main finding prevails. The inclusion of early
expansion states increases the total number of expansion states to 33 and the non-expansion states
remain the same. It is observed that part-time employment (<34 Hrs) increases by 14.3 percentage
points relative to full-time employment (≥35 Hrs), where the main transition is for working less
than 20 hours. These findings are consistent with the benchmark analysis. In addition, the
46The group on married once includes married, divorced, windowed, and separated adults.
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estimates imply that the effect of ACA’s Medicaid expansion on employment is not sensitive to
the exclusion of early expansion states.
Another important robustness check is on the selection of bandwidths. The initial selection
of bandwidth relies on covariate smoothness, where I choose the largest bandwidth possible.
As discussed earlier, there is a tradeoff between sample size and covariate smoothness as the
bandwidth gets wider. It is more likely to have a selection around the cutoff that would fail
the test on covariate smoothness. For the studies that use RD models, it is common to double
the preferred bandwidth as a robustness check (see, for example, Black, Galdo, and Smith, 2007,
Schmieder, Von Wachter, and Bender, 2012). In this case, doubling the bandwidth yields ±8%
FPL around the zero-threshold. As expected, variance gets smaller with the increased bandwidth
and the results on employment (<34 Hrs and <20 Hrs) are highly significant and still have a
positive sign.47
The final robustness check is on the functional form of the running variable, which is defined
as g(d) in Equation (1.6). I provide the estimates on employment for quadratic and cubic running
variables. In either case, the estimates suggest a transition from full-time employment to part-
time employment, which is consistent with the benchmark analysis. It is important to note that
the estimates get smaller as the order of the polynomial increases. Gelman and Imbens (2017)
showed that high-order polynomial in an RD setup could be misleading due to poor properties on
inference, especially on estimating confidence intervals. If the researcher is confident about the
functional form, which is rarely the case, then using a high-order polynomial could be a reasonable
method.
47I also check the robustness of the estimates by changing the preferred bandwidth by ±1% FPL until I have
±10% FPL around the eligibility cutoff. The employment effects for these different bandwidths are fairly robust
but I again caution the readers about covariate smoothness. Note that the estimates are available upon request.
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1.5.4. Difference-in-Differences
The benchmark findings on employment transition, particularly the increase in part-time
employment, contradict to the studies that use the same data source with a different
identification method (see, for example, Gooptu et al., 2016, Leung and Mas, 2016, Kaestner
et al., 2017). In order to replicate existing studies, I estimate the following DD model:
yimts = θ0 + θ1Expansion+ θ2Expansion ∗ Post+X ′iθ3 + δm + γt + ξs + [ψmts] + vimts (1.7)
where Expansion is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if a state is an expansion state and
0 otherwise. The remaining variables are the same as those discussed for Equation (1.6). In
this model, θ2 is an intent-to-treat estimate that shows the changes in labor market outcomes in
expansion states after 2014. Robust standard errors are clustered by state, and individual-level
weights provided by the CPS are used in the regression.
First, I restrict the sample to ±4% FPL and ±8% FPL to make the estimates from DD model
comparable to the benchmark analysis. Second, I use the full sample to compare the estimates
with those in the existing studies. The full sample, however, is larger than the sample in existing
studies because there are more years of data (2010-July 2016) used in the analysis (see Table 1.1
for detailed comparison).48
Table 1.9 presents the findings from the DD model. Columns (1) to (3) show no statistically
significant effect on employment measures. The first two columns show that using the same sample
as the benchmark analysis does not yield similar estimates. The only statistically significant
48There are also minor differences in the sample with respect to the exclusion of states, especially compared to
Kaestner et al. (2017).
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estimate is for labor force participation that has a positive sign. Although the benchmark analysis
show a positive sign for labor force participation, the estimates are statistically insignificant. It is
likely that the significance in the DD model is driven from the large and heterogeneous treatment
group, where many of the ineligible adults are treated as eligible.
For the full sample, the estimates on employment are similar to the studies in the literature.
The probability of being employed in Column (3) increases by 0.2 percentage points and Leung
and Mas (2016) found this increase to be 0.5 percentage points. Again in Column (3), part-time
employment (<35 Hrs) decreases by 0.4 percentage points relative to full-time employment (≥35
Hrs). Kaestner et al. (2017) found an increase in full-time employment, defined as working more
than 30 hours, by 1 percentage point for low-educated childless adults. Using the CPS up to March
2015, Gooptu et al. (2016) show no transition between part-time and full-time employment.49
The findings imply that, using a similar DD model, increasing the sample size is not an
improvement upon the previous findings. The main limitation of the DD model, however, is
not incorporating eligibility and including a population that do not benefit from Medicaid. The
benchmark findings improve upon this regard by using an identification method that captures
eligibility. It is important to note that childless adults who are really close to the eligibility
cutoff share similar characteristics and any changes in the outcomes reflect the effect of Medicaid
expansion. There is, however, a trade off between running into measurement error problems and
using a large and heterogeneous treatment group.
49The probability of transitioning from full-time to part-time employment increases by 0.3 percentage points.
This increase, however, is not statistically different from zero.
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1.6. Discussion
The labor market implications of Medicaid expansions have taken considerable attention in recent
years. There have been studies investigating the labor market implications of Medicaid expansions,
mainly the employment lock effect, prior to the Affordable Care Act (ACA). Many of these studies
focused on a single state expansion (or a small cluster of states) that had limited external validity.
There have been, however, a few studies that investigated the employment effects of the ACA’s
Medicaid expansion with a relatively large set of expansion states. Using a difference-in-differences
(DD) model with expansion states as the treatment group, these studies found no employment
effects after 2014 (see, for example, Gooptu et al., 2016 and Leung and Mas, 2016).
This paper provides an alternative quasi-experimental approach for a population near the
eligibility cutoff to identify the pre/post employment effects of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion.
The data used in the study come from the monthly Current Population Survey (CPS) for the
years 2010 through July 2016. This study uses more years of data in the post-2014 period than
the existing studies to investigate the employment effects of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion. A
common practice in the literature is to construct a simulated eligibility measure using a single
data source. I construct simulated eligibility using both March CPS and basic monthly CPS.
This is an improvement upon using March CPS as the sole data source that has limitations in
capturing the monthly variation in eligibility limits and outcome variables. The internal validity
of the model is tested with respect to contemporaneous shocks and non-random sorting around
the eligibility cutoff. There is no evidence of a selection or a manipulation prior to the expansion.
Using an arguably exogenous variation at the eligibility cutoff, I find that Medicaid
enrollment increases for adults without dependent children (“childless adults”). There is also a
strong evidence of an employment transition, defined as moving from full-time (≥35 Hrs) to
28
part-time employment (<35 Hrs), after the expansion. The employment transition is found to
be driven from the increase in employment for working less than 20 hours. This finding is
consistent with the priori that those who are primarily employed to secure private health
insurance (“employment lock”) will respond to the Medicaid-induced income effect. The
employment transition is found to be heterogeneous across subgroups with a main effect on
females, low-educated adults (HS or less), and adults who are married once. Falsification checks
show no effect on non-expansion states and Medicare-eligible adult groups. In addition, the
estimates are robust to the inclusion of early expansion states, increasing bandwidths, and
varying functional forms of the running variable.
When the difference-in-differences (DD) model is used to replicate existing studies, there are no
employment effects after the expansion. The estimates are similar to those found in the literature.
The main limitation of the DD model, however, is the large and heterogeneous treatment group
that includes adults who are ineligible for Medicaid.
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Figure 1.1: State Medicaid Expansion Profile
Figure 1.2: Density Test for Systematic Manipulation
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Figure 1.3: Medicaid Enrollment Around the Eligibility Cutoff
Figure 1.4: Discontinuity Plots
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Table 1.2: Medicaid Profile Across States
(As of July 2016)
Income Eligibility
States Status of the Medicaid Expansion Effective Date of Expansion† Adults with Children Childless Adults
Alabama Not Expanding - 18% 0%
Alaska Expanded 9/1/2015 138% 138%
Arizona∗ Expanded 1/1/2014 138% 138%
Arkansas∗ Expanded 1/1/2014 138% 138%
California Expanded 1/1/2014 138% 138%
Colorado Expanded 1/1/2014 138% 138%
Connecticut Expanded 1/1/2014 201% 138%
Delaware Expanded 1/1/2014 138% 138%
District of Columbia Expanded 1/1/2014 221% 215%
Florida Not Expanding - 34% 0%
Georgia Not Expanding - 34% 0%
Hawaii Expanded 1/1/2014 138% 138%
Idaho Not Expanding - 26% 0%
Illinois Expanded 1/1/2014 138% 138%
Indiana∗ Expended 2/1/2015 138% 138%
Iowa∗ Expanded 1/1/2014 138% 138%
Kansas Not Expanding - 38% 0%
Kentucky Expanded 1/1/2014 138% 138%
Louisiana Expanded 7/1/2016 138% 138%
Maine Not Expanding - 105% 0%
Maryland Expanded 1/1/2014 138% 138%
Massachusetts Expanded 1/1/2014 138% 138%
Michigan∗ Expanded 4/1/2014 138% 138%
Minnesota Expanded 1/1/2014 138% 138%
Mississippi Not Expanding - 27% 0%
Missouri Not Expanding - 22% 0%
Montana∗ Expanded 1/1/2016 138% 138%
Nebraska Not Expanding - 54% 0%
Nevada Expanded 1/1/2014 138% 138%
New Hampshire∗ Expanded 8/15/2014 138% 138%
New Jersey Expanded 1/1/2014 138% 138%
New Mexico Expanded 1/1/2014 138% 138%
New York Expanded 1/1/2014 138% 138%
North Carolina Not Expanding - 44% 0%
North Dakota Expanded 1/1/2014 138% 138%
Ohio Expanded 1/1/2014 138% 138%
Oklahoma Not Expanding - 44% 0%
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Table 2: Medicaid Profile Across States (Continued)
(As of July 2016)
Income Eligibility
States Status of the Medicaid Expansion Effective Date of Expansion† Adults with Children Childless Adults
Oregon Expanded 1/1/2014 138% 138%
Pennsylvania∗ Expanded 1/1/2015 138% 138%
Rhode Island Expanded 1/1/2014 138% 138%
South Carolina Not Expanding - 67% 0%
South Dakota Not Expanding - 52% 0%
Tennessee Not Expanding - 101% 0%
Texas Not Expanding - 18% 0%
Utah Not Expanding - 45% 0%
Vermont Expanded 1/1/2014 138% 138%
Virginia Not Expanding - 44% 0%
Washington Expanded 1/1/2014 138% 138%
West Virginia Expanded 1/1/2014 138% 138%
Wisconsin Not Expanding - 100% 100%
Wyoming Not Expanding - 57% 0%
Notes: This table is constructed by the author using the information on Medicaid expansion profile provided by the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation.
†There are nine early expansion states: AZ, CO, CT, DE, DC, HI, MN, NY, and VT. In the analysis, WI is considered as an expansion state due to the
eligibility limit of 100% FPL.
∗These states have approved Section 1115 waivers for expanding coverage. This waiver allows states to be flexible in terms of federal Medicaid
requirements and using federal funds.
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Table 1.3: Descriptive Statistics, Monthly CPS 2010-July 2016
Eligible Adults Non-Eligible Adults
Pre-2014 Post-2014 Pre-2014 Post-2014
Panel A: Outcome Variables
Labor Force Participation 53.7% 57.4% 53.4% 58.3%
N 1,223 801 1,335 781
Employed 86.2% 88.2% 86.1% 90.8%
N 669 460 752 1,230
Part-time (PT) Employment (<20 Hrs) 7.3% 8.6% 7.9% 5.7%
PT Employment (20-34 Hrs) 18.8% 17.6 % 20.7% 19.5%
PT Employment (<35 Hrs) 26.0% 26.2% 28.6% 25.2%
N 581 414 658 1,143
Panel B: Control Variables
Female 55.0% 49.2% 51.4% 49.2%
Age 48.1 49.7 48.4 49.0
Married 3.3% 4.4% 3.4% 4.9%
Divorced 35.6% 37.8% 33.4% 37.6%
Widowed 11.4% 9.3% 12.0% 8.7%
Separated 7.5 % 8.9% 7.7% 6.6%
White 56.5% 66.0% 57.6% 64.0%
African-American 36.7% 26.5% 37.4% 28.3%
Asian 1.3% 2.4% 1.1% 3.3%
Less than High School (HS) 15.0% 17.6% 14.2% 18.4%
HS Dropout 35.8% 28.8% 38.7% 31.0%
HS Grad 48.5% 52.3% 43.1% 49.1%
State Unemployment Rate 8.44% 3.66% 8.52% 3.78%
State GDP (% change) 0.40% 0.36% 0.40% 0.39%
N 1,223 801 1,335 781
Notes: The sample is restricted to ±4% FPL around the elgibility cutoff. Nine early expansion states are
excluded from the analysis. Eligible and non-eligible adults are determined using the simulated eligibility
measure. Individual-level weights are used to calculate the sample means. See Section 1.3.3 for the base
group of outcome variables.
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Table 1.6: Labor Market Outcomes: Difference-in-Discontinuities Design, Monthly CPS 2010-July 2016
Expansion States Non-Expansion States
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Labor Force Participation
Eligibility ∗ Post 0.014 0.029 0.032 -0.046 -0.031 -0.032
(0.050) (0.047) (0.047) (0.060) (0.058) (0.058)
[4,140] [4,140] [4,140] [4,079] [4,079] [4,079]
Panel B: Employed
Eligibility ∗ Post 0.009 0.001 -0.001 0.085 0.090 0.094
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.049) (0.048) (0.049)
[2,325] [2,325] [2,325] [2,463] [2,463] [2,463]
Panel C: PT Employment (<20 Hrs)
Eligibility ∗ Post 0.087** 0.098** 0.094** 0.059 0.054 0.053
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038)
[2,056] [2,056] [2,056] [2,229] [2,229] [2,229]
Panel D: PT Employment (20-34 Hrs)
Eligibility ∗ Post 0.048 0.048 0.044 0.023 0.012 0.013
(0.053) (0.054) (0.054) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066)
[2,056] [2,056] [2,056] [2,229] [2,229] [2,229]
Panel E: PT Employment (<35 Hrs)
Eligibility ∗ Post 0.136** 0.146** 0.137** 0.082 0.065 0.066
(0.063) (0.064) (0.064) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070)
[2,056] [2,056] [2,056] [2,229] [2,229] [2,229]
Controls N Y Y N Y Y
State Time-Varying Effects N N Y N N Y
Notes: The sample is restricted to ±4% FPL around the elgibility cutoff. All of the specifications include state fixed effects
and period effects (year and month dummies). See Table 1.3 for a complete list of control variables. State time-varying
effects include both state unemployment rate and state GDP (% change). The definition of part-time (PT) employment
is taken from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Standard errors in parentheses are bootstrapped with 400 replications
and clustered by state. The number of observations are given in brackets. Significance levels are: ***0.01 and **0.05.
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Table 1.9: The Effect of Medicaid Expansion on Labor Market Outcomes:
Difference-in-Differences (DD) Model, Monthly CPS 2010-July 2016
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Labor Force Participation
Expansion ∗ Post 0.078** 0.052 0.007**
(0.039) (0.028) (0.003)
[8,219] [16,455] [2,653,224]
Panel B: Employed
Expansion ∗ Post -0.003 0.014 0.002
(0.029) (0.018) (0.002)
[4,788] [9,592] [1,977,933]
Panel C: PT Employment (<20 Hrs)
Expansion ∗ Post 0.011 0.020 -0.002
(0.018) (0.014) (0.001)
[4,285] [8,556] [1,858,595]
Panel D: PT Employment (20-34 Hrs)
Expansion ∗ Post 0.048 0.030 -0.002
(0.039) (0.033) (0.003)
[4,285] [8,556] [1,858,595]
Panel E: PT Employment (<35 Hrs)
Expansion ∗ Post 0.059 0.050 -0.004
(0.037) (0.037) (0.004)
[4,285] [8,556] [1,858,595]
Sample ±4% FPL ±8% FPL Full Sample
Notes: All of the specifications include control variables, state fixed effects, period effects (year
and month dummies), and state time-varying effects. See Table 1.3 for a complete list of control
variables. State time-varying effects include both state unemployment rate and state GDP (%
change). Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by state and observations are weighted
using the individual-level weights in the CPS. The number of observations are given in brackets.
Significance levels are: ***0.01 and **0.05.
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Chapter 2
The Evidence on Early Retirement After the
Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid Expansion
2.1. Introduction
The Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) Medicaid expansion is a comprehensive health reform for the
low-income population in the United States. Although the expansion was planned to be
nationwide, the Supreme Court decision in 2012 made it optional for states to expand coverage
to low-income adults. In 2014, more than half of the states expanded health insurance coverage
to individuals who are below 138% of the federal poverty level (FPL), which is about $22,107 for
an household size of two in 2016.1 The ACA’s Medicaid expansion most directly targeted adults
without dependent children (“childless adults”) that had no prior eligibility. Starting with the
early expansions in 2010, the uninsured rate reached to a record low in 2015 (Sommers, Kenney,
and Epstein, 2014, Cohen, Martinez, and Zammitti, 2016). Given the availability of Medicaid as
1As of January 2018, there are 33 expansion states and 18 non-expansion states.
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an alternative to employer-sponsored health insurance (ESHI), understanding the extent that
the ACA’s Medicaid expansion affects labor supply has become crucial in the literature.2
A question that follows from the premise that the ACA’s Medicaid expansion affects labor
supply is whether the availability of Medicaid affects the retirement decision of workers. The
ESHI does not necessarily come with retiree benefits and hence the workers might experience a
certain degree of job lock, where they primarily work to secure private health insurance. Most
of the job lock studies focus on job switch/turnover as an outcome variable (see Madrian, 1994b,
Bailey and Chorniy, 2016).3 Since the decision to retire is highly associated with the availability
of health insurance (see Section 2.2 for a detailed literature review), early retirement, defined as
leaving the labor force before the age of 65, could be viewed as a specific type of job lock. This
may be an important concern if workers are no longer productive in specific jobs.4 Reallocation of
these workers in the market with a better worker-employer match or even leaving the labor force
(temporarily or permanent) may improve total output in the long-run. There is a vast literature
showing a positive relationship between retiree health insurance (RHI) and early retirement, but
there are only a few studies focusing on the relationship between the ACA’s Medicaid expansion
and early retirement. The ACA’s Medicaid expansion increases the pool of eligible workers that
could substitute Medicaid for ESHI in order to retire early. This study takes a novel approach to
investigate the effect of Medicaid enrollment on the retirement decision of childless adults aged
55 to 64 years.
The data set used in this study is the American Community Survey (ACS) from 2009 to
2016. The retirement outcomes are not only analyzed for all childless adults but also for men and
2There are a number of studies that investigate the relationship between labor market outcomes and the ACA’s
Medicaid expansion (Kaestner et al., 2017, Duggan, Goda, and Jackson, 2017, Aslim, 2016, Gooptu et al., 2016,
Kim, 2016, Leung and Mas, 2016).
3Bailey and Chorniy (2016), for example, investigated the presence of job lock using the ACA’s dependent
coverage mandate as a natural experiment.
4A worker might experience productive loss during a tenure due to various reasons including medical problems.
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women. In all specifications, the OLS estimates suggest an increase in the probability of retirement
for childless adults who enroll for Medicaid, which range between 0.5 to 0.7 percentage points.
These estimates should be interpreted with caution due to reverse causality and endogeneity.
The theoretical framework in Section 2.3 shows that adults with higher medical expenses have
more incentive to reduce working hours (or increase leisure) to qualify for Medicaid. This finding
suggests that retirement may affect Medicaid enrollment. On the other hand, unobserved health
outcomes are correlated with both Medicaid enrollment and retirement, which introduces another
channel of bias. The variables on health outcomes in the ACS are related to disability. Thus, it
is not possible to control for a variety of health outcomes.
In order to disentangle the causal effect of Medicaid on early retirement, I instrument Medicaid
enrollment with an interaction term that exploits states’ decision to expand and the corresponding
timing of expansion (see Table 2.1 for both the expansion decision and timing). The instrument
could be used as an intent-to-treat (ITT) estimate of a difference-in-differences (DD) model that
captures the changes in the probability of retirement in expansion states. The ITT estimates
imply that the probability of retirement increases in expansion states after the time of expansion.
It is crucial to note that the only channel that expansion states can affect retirement is through
Medicaid enrollment, which supports the exclusion restriction of the instrument used in this study.
Since the purpose of ACA’s Medicaid expansion is to increase coverage among low-income adults,
there is no evidence on policy endogeneity with respect to retirement.
The first stage results show that Medicaid enrollment increases by 4 percentage points in
expansion states after the ACA’s Medicaid expansion. The F-statistics ranges between 28.96 and
39.23 across specifications, which implies that the instrument is not weak according to traditional
approaches (Stock and Yogo, 2005). I find that the probability of early retirement increases by
14.8 percentage points for all childless adults who are enrolled for Medicaid. For men and women,
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the increase in the probability of early retirement is 13.4 and 16.1 percentage points, respectively.
These estimates are much larger than the estimates obtained from the OLS regression.
The main findings from the IV regression differ from those found in Gustman, Steinmeier,
and Tabatabai (2016) and Levy, Buchmueller, and Nikpay (2016) that show no effect on early
retirement. Using the Current Population Survey (CPS), Levy, Buchmueller, and Nikpay (2016)
estimate the trends in retirement before and after expansion for all adults aged 50 to 64 years.
When all adults are pooled together in the sample, it is likely to underestimate the effect of
Medicaid on retirement due to the fact that parents have access to Medicaid in both expansion
and non-expansion states pre- and post-2014. This study distinguishes from Levy, Buchmueller,
and Nikpay (2016) by not only focusing on childless adults but also identifying those who are
enrolled for Medicaid. Gustman, Steinmeier, and Tabatabai (2016), on the other hand, focus
on the effect of ACA’s enactment in 2010 on early retirement. Their sample period ends in
2014 and hence the study does not capture the effect of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion on early
retirement.5 Since most of the coverage gains under the ACA happened with Medicaid expansion,
I focus particularly on the period after 2014 (Frean, Gruber, and Sommers, 2017).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 provides a detailed summary of the literature,
Section 2.3 introduces a theoretical framework on leisure and health insurance, Section 2.4 provides
a background information on expansion and non-expansion states, Section 3.3 describes the data
and Section 2.6 describes the empirical methodology, Section 3.5 presents the results and Section
3.6 concludes.
5The data used in this study come from the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS).
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2.2. Prior Research on Health Insurance and Early Retirement
This section provides a detailed analysis of the literature on health insurance and early retirement.
Most of the previous studies focus on the availability of retiree health insurance (RHI) and its
impact on early retirement. In order to make these studies comparable, I analyze them with
respect to the choice of data set. There are a number of studies that use the Survey of Income
and Program Participation (SIPP) and the Current Population Survey (CPS). A common data
set is the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS). There are also a few studies that either use
administrative data or confidential data from consulting companies. Since the current ACA
studies are comparable to mine, I leave the analysis of those to the end.
Madrian (1994a) provides an earlier evidence on the issue using the 1987 National Medical
Expenditure Survey (NMES) with two modules of the Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP) for the panels between 1984 and 1986.6 Using age at retirement as the
outcome variable, the paper finds that individuals with RHI retire 5 to 16 months earlier than
those without the health insurance benefits.7 The paper further shows sizable reductions in
labor force participation in the case of a health reform towards universal coverage. Karoly and
Rogowski (1994) also use the SIPP to investigate the effect of continuation of the
employer-provided health insurance (“continuation coverege”) on the retirement decision. As
different from Madrian (1994a), Karoly and Rogowski (1994) extend the analysis to the 1988
panel of SIPP. The findings, however, are consistent in showing a positive effect on the
probability of retirement.
There are a number of studies that use the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) as the main
data source to have a dynamic retirement framework. Marton, Woodbury, and Wolfe (2007) use
6The two modules of SIPP are on education, work history, and job characteristics.
7The paper addresses censoring problems related to the outcome variable and selection into jobs.
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the three waves of the HRS between 1992-1996, and find a 55 percent increase in the probability
of retirement for employees with retiree health benefits.8 They also find heterogeneous effects
for men with full-time employed wife and unmarried men. Using the same data period from the
HRS, Rogowski and Karoly (2000) find an increase in the probability of retirement by 68 percent
for those who have access to RHI.9 Both studies define retirement as a transition from full-time
employment to being retired in the following wave(s). The difference in the estimates, however, is
argued to be driven by the differential coding of the existing control variables and/or the sample
size of the last wave.
In a study that uses a discrete-time hazard model, Marton and Woodbury (2013) test for
the effect of delayed payment contracts in the form of retiree health benefits on the retirement
decision of workers in different age groups. When given retiree health benefits, the study shows
that workers at the ages of 50 and 51 are less likely to retire than those at the ages of 60 and 61.
Robinson and Clark (2010), on the other hand, use a Cox proportional hazard model to analyze
the impact of RHI on the decision to separate from employment. Using the eight waves of the HRS
between 1992-2006, the findings suggest an increase in the likelihood of job seperation by 21.2
percent for individuals with access to RHI than those without any access. Kapur and Rogowski
(2011) also use the eight waves of the HRS to study the retirement decision of women with respect
to the availability of RHI.10 The availability of RHI increases the probability of retirement by 3
and 4.8 percentage points for women in dual-earner couples and single women, respectively.
Strumpf (2010) uses the HRS to not only show the impact of RHI on early retirement but
also to analyze the changes in health care utilization, medical costs, and health outcomes. Using
8The authors are conservative with respect to the causal interpretation of their estimates.
9Marton, Woodbury, and Wolfe (2007) used the final release of the HRS data for wave three whereas Rogowski
and Karoly (2000) used the alpha release of the wave three data with less observations.
10Retirement is defined as a transition from full-time employment in the baseline year to retirement at the next
survey date.
47
a probit model, she finds an increase in the probability of early retirement by 37 percent when
workers have access to RHI. Shoven and Slavov (2014), on the other hand, exploit a multinomial
logit to model the retirement decision as a transition from full-time employment to part-time
employment (“partial retirement”) or leaving the labor force. The sample is restricted to public
sector workers who have access to group health coverage before qualifying for Medicare. The
paper shows an increase in the probability of leaving full-time employment by 38 and 26 percent
for workers in the age groups 55-59 and 60-64, respectively. The findings also suggest that workers
in the former age group are more likely to transition into part-time employment whereas those in
the latter age group are more likely to leave the labor force. Blau and Gilleskie (2001) also use a
multinomial logit model that incorporates employment transitions. As different from prior studies,
the model accounts for a possible correlation between the unobservable factors affecting health
insurance and the unobservable factors affecting employment decisions. The results indicate an
increase in the exit rate from employment by 2 percentage points when individuals share the cost
of RHI with the firm, and the increase gets larger as the firm pays all of the insurance costs.
Although reduce form models are common in the literature, some studies use the HRS to
estimate a dynamic stochastic model of retirement. Blau and Gilleskie (2006) simulate the
retirement decision for multiple scenarios including the availability of RHI for those who do not
have any coverage, having a universal health coverage, and increasing the age limit under
Medicare. The authors show differential effects for men and women, where non-employment
increases for the former (3.1 percentage points) and decreases for the latter (1.8 percentage
points) with the inclusion of RHI. Blau and Gilleskie (2008), on the other hand, show an
increase in non-employment by 3.6 percentage points after the provision of retiree health
benefits for men who had employer-sponsored health insurance with no retiree health benefits.
It is crucial to note that both Blau and Gilleskie (2006) and Blau and Gilleskie (2008) do not
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model savings decision of individuals. Accounting for savings behavior in the model, French and
Jones (2011) find that individuals with RHI retire half a year earlier than those who try to
secure health insurance by working.
There are a few studies that use the Current Population Survey (CPS) to investigate the
relationship between health insurance and early retirement. Gruber and Madrian (1996) exploit
the mandates that allow individuals to purchase group health insurance from their employers.
The study uses the Merged Outgoing Rotation Group (MORG) of the CPS for the years between
1980 and 1990. Using a probit model, they find an increase in early retirement by 5.4 percent with
respect to an increase in continuation coverage by 1 year. Gruber and Madrian (1995) also find
a positive relationship between the probability of retirement and continuation coverage such that
the hazard ratio increases by 32.4 percent with 1 year of continuation coverage. Boyle and Lahey
(2010), on the other hand, use the health insurance expansion of the U.S. Department of Veterans
Affairs as a natural experiment to analyze the labor supply of older veterans. The data set used
in the study is the March CPS between 1992 and 2002. The authors show a 3.3 percent decrease
in the probability of employment after the health expansion by utilizing a difference-in-differences
(DD) approach. The findings also suggest a 8.4 percent increase in part-time employment.11
Nyce et al. (2013) exploit an employee-level data from the clients of a benefits consulting firm,
Tower Watson, for the years 2005 through 2009. The data set provides employee records of 54
firms and information on the size of the employer contribution towards health coverage. The
findings imply that the probability of not being employed (defined as “turnover”) increases by 36
percent at age 62 for workers with subsidized coverage. The increase in the probability of turnover
is 49 percent and 38 percent when ages are 63 and 64, respectively. No effects are found for those
who do not meet the eligibility criteria based on years of service for coverage contribution.
11The effect on self-employment is negative but it is not statistically different from zero.
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Similar to Shoven and Slavov (2014), Fitzpatrick (2014) analyzes the retirement decision of
public sector workers given the availability of RHI, but uses a different data set. The author
specifically focuses on public school teachers using an administrative data from Illinois Public
Schools (IPS) for the school years between 1970-1971 and 1991-1992. The employee needs to have
8 years of tenure to qualify for retirement benefits. Using eligibility for RHI as the treatment, the
author shows that eligible workers retire 2 years early.12
All of the studies discussed above show a positive relationship between RHI (or continuation
coverage) and early retirement. These studies focus on RHI due to the limitation in health
insurance alternatives for workers who want to retire early. An alternative health insurance
option is made available under the public expansion program of the ACA, which is known as the
ACA’s Medicaid expansion. Although Medicaid is viewed as an alternative for RHI, its effect on
early retirement has not been discovered widely in the literature. As far as I know, there are
only two studies investigating the aforementioned relationship. Using the basic monthly CPS,
Levy, Buchmueller, and Nikpay (2016) stratify the sample into expansion and non-expansion
states and try to capture a possible jump in January 2014. The findings indicate no effect on
the probability of retirement and part-time employment after the ACA’s Medicaid expansion. As
discussed by Aslim (2016), large and heterogeneous treatment groups included in expansion states
may jeopardize the estimates for labor market outcomes.
Gustman, Steinmeier, and Tabatabai (2016) use the HRS to investigate the effect of the ACA
on early retirement for the period between 2010 and 2014. The study does not find any impact
on early retirement resulting from the ACA. Note that the model does not capture the Medicaid
expansion in the post-2014 period. Earlier studies show an evidence of reduced working hours
with respect to Medicaid expansions (Garthwaite, Gross, and Notowidigdo, 2014, Aslim, 2016,
12One limitation of the study is on external validity because the author drops public schools in large cities.
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Dague, DeLeire, and Leininger, 2017). In fact, Frean, Gruber, and Sommers (2017) found that 30
percent of the ACA’s impact on coverage came after 2014. If job lock is strong, then the provisions
between 2010 and 2014 might not be effective in incentivising detachment from the labor force.13
2.3. Theoretical Framework
This section introduces a simple static model for a representative household to investigate the
relationship between early retirement, modeled as hours of leisure (L), and health insurance
(I) that captures the availability of Medicaid. In order to construct the basis of the model, I
follow French and Jones (2011) closely. The model, however, differentiates with respect to the
construction of health and health insurance variables and the household characteristics. French
and Jones (2011) include households above the age of 64 to show the impact of Medicare on labor
supply.14 The main group of interest here is households between the ages of 55 and 64 who are
qualified for Medicaid under the Affordable Care Act.
The objective of a representative household is to maximize utility that consists of consumption,
C, and L,
U(C,L), (2.1)
where U is strictly concave in both goods. The first constraint faced by the individual is a time
constraint
T = L+N +H, (2.2)
13For adults aged 51 to 56 years, the effective provisions of the ACA within those periods are the changes
regarding private health insurance (e.g., eliminating pre-existing conditions), the introduction of health insurance
exchanges, and couple of early expansions.
14Using a dynamic model, they also simulate the effect of employer-provided health insurance on labor force
participation rates.
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where T is the total time available and N is the hours allotted to work. It is reasonable to exclude
fixed costs resulting from employment and labor market reentry because having both decisions
exogenous in the model do not change the outcome of the analysis. The loss of leisure due to time
spent sick is captured by H. The production of health depends on health insurance (I) via access
to medical care and all other factors (X) including gender, age, and education. This allows us to
define sick days as H = H(I,X). The second constraint in the model is a budget constraint
Y = C +M, (2.3)
where household income, Y , is a function of all government transfers/benefits (Social Security,
financial aid etc.), fringe benefits including pensions, spouse’s income, asset income, wages, and
hours worked. Without loss of generality, I assume that wage is fixed and does not vary with
working hours and health. The household income is defined as Y = Y (A,L), where A is all
taxable income/benefits that do not vary with L. Medical expenses, on the other hand, are a
function of health and health insurance, M = M(H, I). For the health insurance (I), I consider
the availability of Medicaid for the household. The likelihood of having Medicaid is defined as a
probability function that is conditional on leisure:
I = Prob(Medicaid = 1|L) = Φ(L). (2.4)
This aim here is to capture the positive relationship between leisure and the likelihood of
having Medicaid. Since the main focus of the study is on individuals who enroll for Medicaid, I
do not exploit the availability of RHI. In addition, most of the low-income adults have limited
access to health insurance benefits offered by full-time jobs.15
15In a dynamic framework, however, it would be interesting to investigate the employment outcomes of individuals
who choose between RHI and Medicaid.
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The utility maximization problem could be defined as an unconstrained optimization with
L being the choice variable. The first order condition to the maximization problem yields the
following marginal rate of substitution (MRS)
UL
UC
=
∂Y
∂L − ∂M∂H ∂H∂I ∂I∂L − ∂M∂I ∂I∂L
∂H
∂I
∂I
∂L
, (2.5)
where UL and UC represent marginal utilities with respect to L and C. The signs of the partial
derivatives are
∂Y
∂L︸︷︷︸
<0
− ∂M
∂H
∂H
∂I
φ(L)︷︸︸︷
∂I
∂L︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
− ∂M
∂I
φ(L)︷︸︸︷
∂I
∂L︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
and
∂H
∂I
φ(L)︷︸︸︷
∂I
∂L︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
, (2.6)
where φ(L) is the probability distribution of Medicaid that varies with L. Given the signs, two
scenarios emerge depending on the magnitude of ∂Y∂L :
i) If income loss due to leisure is large in magnitude relative to medical expenses, there is going be
less leisure and more consumption at the equilibrium, which implies that UL > UC . The individual
is less likely to retire due to the relative magnitude of income loss (e.g., younger adults).
ii) If income loss due to leisure is small in magnitude relative to medical expenses, the equilibrium
choice of leisure is going to be higher than consumption, which implies that UL < UC . The
individual is more likely to retire because medical expenses outweigh income loss due to leisure
(e.g., older adults).
These implications are consistent with the priori that individuals between the ages of 55 and
64 are more likely to retire early due to the decrease in the opportunity cost of leisure with
respect to medical expenses. This also raises concerns about adults self-selecting into Medicaid
by manipulating income. On the other hand, younger adults tend to have better health and their
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loss of income due to leisure is likely to outweigh medical expenses. This model, however, does not
capture any savings decisions and/or family considerations that could give more insights about
the retirement decision vis-a`-vis the changes in income.
2.4. Selection of Expansion and Non-Expansion States
The timing of Medicaid expansion is crucial in order to disentangle the casual effect of Medicaid on
early retirement. Although most of the expansion states increased their eligibility limits to 138%
FPL in January 2014, some states had a head start in expanding Medicaid coverage for childless
adults before January 2014 (“early expansion states”). There are also a number of states that
expanded Medicaid coverage after January 2014 (“late expansion states”). Early expansion states
differ not only in their timing of expansion but also in terms of the coverage benefits provided for
childless adults. Column (3) in Table 2.1, on one hand, includes the list of early expansion states
that provided full coverage for eligible childless. Column (1), on the other hand, lists the states
that provided limited coverage before the ACA’s Medicaid expansion. The mandatory benefits of
Medicaid include inpatient and outpatient hospital services, nursing facility services, laboratory
and X-ray services, and many more.16
There are 13 states that provided limited coverage for adults, mainly to access primary care
services, before the expansion in 2014 (see Table 2.1 for a complete list of states). California, an
expansion state, provided limited coverage for adults under the Medicaid Coverage Expansion
(MCE) and the Health Care Coverage Initiative (HCCI) before January 2014 (Alker et al.,
2013). Utah, a non-expansion state, signed the 1115 Primary Care Network (PCN)
Demonstration Waiver in December 2011 that provided limited coverage of primary care services
for childless adults. Ten of these states with limited benefits fully expanded Medicaid in 2014
16See full list of mandatory benefits at http://Medicaid.gov.
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(labeled as “E” in column (1)) or after 2014 (labeled as “LE” in column (1)), and the remaining
three states opted-out of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion in 2014 (labeled as “NE” in column
(1)).
In column (2) of Table 2.1, there are two states with closed enrollment that provided full
coverage for eligible adults before January 2014. In 2000, Arizona expanded Medicaid coverage
for childless adults below 100% FPL. In May 2011, over 200,000 childless adults enrolled for the
program. On July 8, 2011, Arizona decided to freeze enrollment to redesign Medicaid program
to reduce costs. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) approved Arizona’s new
Section 1115 waiver on October 21, 2011. Arizona expanded Medicaid for childless below 138%
FPL in 2014. Colorado, on the other hand, extended Medicaid coverage to jobless childless adults
who are below 10% FPL in May 2012. The state capped the enrollment to 10,000 adults. Similar
to the case in Arizona, Colorado fully expanded Medicaid to 138% FPL in 2014.
Due to limited benefits and/or limited enrollment, I include expansion (E) and non-expansion
states (NE) in columns (1) and (2) in the main analysis. The early expansion states in column (3)
and late expansion states in column (4) are excluded from the analysis to capture the main effect
of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion in January 2014. I probe the robustness of the estimates to the
inclusion of early and late expansion states. A consistent selection of states in the main analysis is
very important for the studies on the ACA’s Medicaid expansion. Levy, Buchmueller, and Nikpay
(2016), for example, exclude California, Massachusetts, and Arizona (a closed enrollment state)
in the main analysis by assuming that three states have provided full benefits before January
2014. On the other hand, they include Colorado (a closed enrollment state) and the remaining
limit benefit states in the main analysis, which contradicts the initial exclusion of three states.
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2.5. Data
The data set used in the study is the American Community Survey (ACS) for the years between
2009 and 2016. The ACS provides annual information on health insurance, labor market outcomes
and demographic characteristics before and after the ACA’s Medicaid expansion. As far as I know,
this is the first study to use the ACS to investigate the relationship between health insurance and
early retirement. There are pros and cons of using the ACS compared to March CPS and HRS
for early retirement studies. The ACS data include geographic identifiers that allow a researcher
to distinguish between expansion and non-expansion states whereas the publicly available HRS
do not include geographic identifiers. In this study, geographic identifiers are used to create
an instrument for Medicaid. In addition, the number of observations for childless adults in the
ACS is higher than both March CPS and HRS. One limitation of the ACS (and March CPS) is
the absence of longitudinal waves, where one can only track labor market outcomes of different
individuals over time.17 The Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) could be viewed
as an alternative data set but the latest release is for 2014 as of the writing of this paper.
Since this study focuses on the early retirement decision of childless adults, I restrict the
sample to adults without own or related children under the age of 18. The sample is also limited
to adults between the ages of 55 and 64.18 In order to be consistent with the previous studies, I
choose the lower limit of age to be 55. In addition, the model proposed in Section 2.3 suggests
that the higher valuation of income loss at equilibrium might disincetivize a possible reduction in
labor supply for younger adults. I later test whether the findings are sensitive to the changes in
the lower limit of age. The main outcome variable, retirement (Retired), is defined as an indicator
17A minor limitation is that the ACS data are released annually, which do not capture the monthly variation
in policy variables. This limitation also exists for March CPS, also known as the Annual Social and Economic
Supplement (ASEC), since the data do not vary by months.
18Note that adults are eligible for Medicare past age 64 and hence could confound the estimates on Medicaid.
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variable taking the value 1 if a person has retirement income in past 12 months and 0 otherwise.
An important control variable in the model that affects the retirement decision of an individual
is the work status of a spouse.19 I define the work status of a spouse (Working Spouse) as 1 if a
spouse is employed and 0 otherwise. I also control for different levels of educational attainment
with an omitted category of having college education or more.
Table 2.2: Descriptive Characteristics of Childless Adults Aged 55-64 Years,
ACS 2009-2016.
All Without Medicaid With Medicaid
(N = 1, 487, 639) (N = 1, 332, 304) (N = 155, 335)
Outcome Variable
Retired 0.098 0.094 0.130
Control Variables
Age 59.32 59.32 59.34
Female 0.513 0.511 0.536
White 0.797 0.813 0.663
African-American 0.109 0.098 0.202
Asian 0.046 0.045 0.052
Hispanic 0.107 0.099 0.165
Married 0.641 0.676 0.48
Widowed 0.054 0.049 0.093
Divorced 0.187 0.174 0.297
Separated 0.024 0.020 0.057
Less than HS 0.055 0.043 0.154
HS Dropout 0.066 0.054 0.162
HS Grad 0.238 0.234 0.264
Working Spouse 0.276 0.282 0.226
Notes: ACS individual-level weights are used in computing means.
The outcome variables and individual characteristics are summarized in Table 2.2. I stratify
the sample into childless adults with Medicaid and without Medicaid to gain more insights about
individuals who enroll for a means-tested program. Although sample size decreases significantly,
the changes in demographic characteristics and retirement are consistent with the priori. Based on
19There are studies in the literature that control for either the employment of spouse or the wage (Kapur and
Rogowski, 2011, Marton, Woodbury, and Wolfe, 2007).
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the summary statistics, those with Medicaid are more likely to retire early. As for the demographic
characteristics, those with Medicaid are more likely to be African-American and Hispanic. They
are also more likely to be divorced and have relatively lower educational attainment than adults
without Medicaid. Since the ACA’s Medicaid expansion targets low-income childless adults, the
sample composition here is a relatively good representation of the Medicaid population.
2.6. Methods
The empirical approach used in this study exploits the decision to expand and the timing of
expansion given in Table 2.3 to estimate the effect of Medicaid enrollment on early retirement.
The following model is used to analyze the changes in labor market outcomes:
yist = β0 + β1Medicaidist +X
′
istβ3 + δ1t + σ1s + ist. (2.7)
The dependent variable, yist, is an indicator variable on retirement for individual i in state s
at time t (year). Medicaid takes the value 1 if the childless adult is enrolled for Medicaid and 0
otherwise. The vector of individual characteristics given in Table 2.2 are denoted as Xist. The
year and state fixed effects are defined as δ1t and σ1s, respectively. Standard errors are clustered
at the state-level to account for any serial correlation within states of similar characteristics. The
individual-level weights provided by the ACS are used to obtain the estimates.
As the theory suggests in Section 2.3, those who are in need of medical care could reduce
working hours to qualify for Medicaid. This implies the presence of reverse causality. In addition,
there are disability measures in the ACS, but they are limited in capturing the demand for medical
care.20 A possible remedy is to instrument for Medicaid using the timing of expansions in order
20The estimates are not sensitive to the exclusion of disabled adults. These findings are available upon request.
59
to have an exogenous variation in the variable of interest. The instrument that I construct is
an interaction variable that consists of Expansion, a binary variable on whether a state is an
expansion state or a non-expansion state, and Post, another binary variable that takes the value
1 after 2014 and 0 before 2014. When early and late expansion states are included in the analysis,
the timing of expansion and the variable on Post changes accordingly. The instrument is assumed
to have a positive relationship with Medicaid enrollment due to the relative increase in the pool
of eligible adults in expansion states.
The only channel that expansion states can affect retirement is through Medicaid enrollment
and hence the exclusion restriction is satisfied. Given the instrument, the first stage can be
described as a difference-in-differences (DD) model:
Medicaidist = α0 + α1Expansions ∗ Postt +X ′istα3 + δ2t + σ2s + ist, (2.8)
where α1 could be interpreted as the casual effect of the policy change on Medicaid enrollment
relying on the assumption that expansion states and non-expansions do not trend differentially in
the absence of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion. Since the purpose of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion
is to reduce the rate of uninsured, it is assumed that the policy is exogenous with respect to
retirement. In addition to exclusion restriction and policy exogeneity, I assume that there are no
spillovers resulting from the treatment that changes the outcome of other childless adults, which
is referred as the stable unit treatment value assumption (or “SUTVA”). The estimates provided
in the regression tables include both the first stage findings and the corresponding two-stage least
squares (2SLS) results.21
21The estimates are obtained using the ivregress command in Stata 15.
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2.7. Results
2.7.1. Main Results
Some of the previous studies restrict the sample to only men and do not capture possible
heterogeneity in outcomes with respect to gender (Rogowski and Karoly, 2000, Marton,
Woodbury, and Wolfe, 2007, Boyle and Lahey, 2010). I analyze the changes in outcomes for
three different samples: all childless adults, men, and women. All of these samples include
childless adults aging from 55 to 64 years in expansion and non-expansion states (referred as the
“main sample”). Early and late expansion states are excluded from the analysis. Later, in
Section 2.7.2, these states are included for the purpose of robustness checks. The tables include
the estimates from the OLS regression, the first stage of the 2SLS regression (denoted as “First
Stage”), and the second stage of the 2SLS regression (denoted as “IV”). I denote the F-statistics
on omitted instrument (Expansion ∗ Post) to show the strength of the first stage results. As
mentioned earlier, all of the specifications include control variables, state fixed effects, and year
fixed effects.
The first stage estimates are fairly consistent across samples (see Table 2.3). Medicaid
enrollment increases by 4 percentage points in expansion states after 2014. The F-statistics on
excluded instrument ranges between 28.96 and 39.23 for columns (1), (5) and (9). This finding
implies that, given the traditional approaches, the instrument is not weak and the strength of
the first stage is good (Stock and Yogo, 2005). The IV estimates show that Medicaid increases
early retirement by 14.8 percentage points. For men and women, the increase in early retirement
is 13.4 and 16.1 percentage points, respectively. For the OLS regressions, the estimates are much
smaller than the IV estimates, which range between approximately 1 percentage point and 2
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percentage points. These findings support previous studies that show a positive relationship
between health insurance and early retirement.
A model that is widely used in the ACA literature is the difference-in-differences (DD) model
that uses expansion states as the treatment group (see, for example, Kaestner et al., 2017, Gooptu
et al., 2016). This model provides intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates since all childless adults in
expansion states are assumed to receive the treatment (i.e. enrolling for Medicaid). In columns
(2), (6), and (10), I test whether the findings on early retirement prevail using ITT estimates.
I use the first stage regression given in Equation (2.8) by changing the dependent variable to
retirement. As expected, the ITT estimates are much smaller than the estimates found in the
main analysis. The impact of expansion on early retirement ranges between 0.5 to 0.7 percentage
points. It is very convenient to use DD models that provide ITT estimates, but the estimates
should be interpreted with caution. There is a lot of heterogeneity in the treatment group by
construction that is likely to confound the potential effect. In Section 2.7.2, I further test the
robustness of the IV estimates and the ITT estimates.
2.7.2. Robustness Checks
Since the main analysis excludes early expansion states (7 states) and late expansion states (7
states), I test whether the estimates on Medicaid are robust to the inclusion of these 14 states
(see Table 2.4). Note that Post was initially taking the value 1 after 2014 and 0 otherwise.
Now the indicator variable changes with the timing of early expansion and late expansion instead
of changing with the 2014 threshold. Table 2.4 shows that the estimates are fairly robust the
inclusion of these states. The F-statistics on excluded instrument varies between 24.38 and 28.18,
which is still relatively strong. The OLS estimates are still smaller than the IV estimates. There
is a 14 percentage points increase in the probability of early retirement for childless adults who
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enroll for Medicaid. In columns (8) and (12), the probability of early retirement increases by 11.8
and 15.8 percentage points for men and women, respectively. Although the statistical significance
is weakened in column (8) compared to the one in Table 2.3, the estimates are still positive and
comparable. For the ITT estimates in columns (2), (6), and (10), there is an increase in the
probability of retirement in the expansion states after 2014, but the estimate for men is no longer
statistically significant. This implies that the ITT estimates are more sensitive to the selection of
states.
Next robust check is on changing the lower limit of the age for childless adults. The initial
sample includes childless adults aged 55 to 64 years. This age restriction for the lower limit is the
same as the previous studies that investigated the effect of RHI on early retirement (Gruber and
Madrian, 1996, Rogowski and Karoly, 2000, Boyle and Lahey, 2010, Shoven and Slavov, 2014,
Fitzpatrick, 2014). On the other hand, there are some retirement studies that use 50-51 as the
lower limit for age (Strumpf, 2010, Robinson and Clark, 2010, Levy, Buchmueller, and Nikpay,
2016). Thus, I test the robustness of the findings in Table 2.3 with respect to the changes in age
restriction. Table 2.5 contains the estimates on the relationship between Medicaid enrollment and
early retirement for childless adults aged 50 to 64 years. The estimates are still fairly robust to the
changes in the sample. The findings show that the effect on early retirement for women becomes
smaller in magnitude, which also decreases the estimates for the main sample. This finding is
intuitive because the inclusion of younger adults will dampen the effect of Medicaid on the decision
to retire. The ITT estimates are also sensitive to the changes in age restriction. Although the
expansion affects retirement positively, now the estimate for women is not statistically different
from zero. Overall, this analysis suggests that using expansion states as a treatment group could
be problematic given that it is sensitive to sample selection.
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2.8. Conclusion
There has been an increasing amount of studies investigating the relationship between health
insurance and labor market outcomes. There are various studies that show the presence of job
lock in the United States. Policy makers in certain states are responding to the unforeseen effects
of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion. Kentucky recently adopted work requirements for Medicaid
eligibility. As of January 2018, there are more states waiting to get approval from the CMS for
their work requirement waiver. The effect of work requirements on enrollment and labor market
outcomes still remain as an empirical question. Since the nature of the Medicaid program is
changing by adopting certain welfare rules, it is crucial to understand the spillover effects under
the ACA. I investigate the retirement effects of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion on childless adults
aged 55 to 64 years.
This study finds an evidence of an increase in the probability of early retirement for childless
adults who have access to Medicaid. First stage results imply that Medicaid enrollment
increases in expansion states after 2014. Both men and women are affected by the ACA’s
Medicaid expansion in terms of retirement. The estimates are robust to the changes made to the
sample with respect to the selection of expansion states and age restriction. Overall, these
findings imply the presence of work disincentives under the ACA’s Medicaid expansion.
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Chapter 3
Woodwork Effects and Medicaid Expansion:
Evidence from the Affordable Care Act
3.1. Introduction
Medicaid is a public health insurance program for low-income populations that dates back to the
authorization of Title XIX of the Social Security Act in 1965.1 The Affordable Care Act (ACA)
proposed major changes to the Medicaid program including the standardization of means testing
with higher income eligibility limits. The program’s purpose is not elusive, and yet it had many
road blocks on spreading coverage to adults below the federal poverty level (FPL). In 2012, the
Supreme Court found the ACA’s Medicaid expansion to be unconstitutional and allowed states to
opt out of the program. The decision left states with varying income eligibility limits for parents
and adults without children.2 The uninsured rate under the ACA’s Medicaid expansion, however,
reached a historic low in 2016 for low-income parents from 22.17% in 2010 to 12.59% in 2016 (see
1Medicaid and Medicare were signed into law by President Lyndon B. Johnson on June 30, 1965.
2Most expansion states covered adults with incomes below 138% FPL.
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Figure 3.1 in Section 3.2).
Previous studies exploit earlier expansions and eligibility rules to investigate the changes in
Medicaid enrollment among low-income parents and children. Cutler and Gruber (1996) show
that Medicaid expansions crowd-out private insurance, later supported by Gruber and Simon
(2008) for the 1996-2002 period.3 Using the change in income eligibility limits between 1996 and
2007, Hamersma and Kim (2013) find an increase in Medicaid enrollment for parents. Current
studies also exploit eligibility rules under the ACA to investigate the effect of Medicaid expansion
on enrollment (see, for example, Sommers and Epstein, 2010b, Sommers, Swartz, and Epstein,
2011, Aslim, 2016, Kaestner et al., 2017).4 The ACA’s Medicaid expansion, however, differs from
earlier expansions with respect to eligibility rules and the extent of outreach.
Under the ACA’s Medicaid expansion, outreach efforts are supported by new marketplaces
that ease the application process with simplified and data driven technologies. States use
“navigators” to increase Medicaid enrollment among hard-to-reach communities including
minorities (Hispanic or non-white adults) and immigrants with language barriers. Navigators
(or certified application counselors) are individuals or organizations that not only assist
consumers throughout the enrollment process, but also contribute to outreach by raising
awareness about the Marketplace. Aizer (2003) finds that bilingual enrollment assistance
increases Medicaid enrollment among Hispanic and Asian communities in California.
Since outreach is limited in earlier expansions, the role of information in fostering enrollment
has not been investigated in previous studies. Sommers et al. (2012b) argue that high take-up rates
in Massachusetts after the 2006 health reform is a combined outcome of raising awareness about
coverage options and outreach efforts. The information effect via outreach combined with the
3There is a vast literature on the crowd-out effects of earlier expansions for low-income children (Dubay and
Kenney, 1996, Yazici and Kaestner, 2000, Card and Shore-Sheppard, 2004, Ham and Shore-Sheppard, 2005).
4McMorrow et al. (2015), for example, show that the ACA’s Medicaid expansion did not lower the number of
uninsured among young adults in the short-run.
69
change in eligibility limits may increase enrollment among previously-eligible adults that do not
take-up Mediciad, which is referred as the “woodwork” or “welcome-mat” effect (see, for example,
Sonier, Boudreaux, and Blewett, 2013). There are a few studies that analyze woodwork effects
under the ACA’s Medicaid expansion. Sommers, Kenney, and Epstein (2014) show an increase
in Medicaid enrollment among previously-eligible parents in Connecticut. Frean, Gruber, and
Sommers (2017) show that 30% of coverage gains after the first year of ACA’s Medicaid expansion
is due to woodwork effects.5
Woodwork effects are often disregarded in studies that explore the changes in Medicaid take-
up. This study contributes to the literature by formally analyzing the components of woodwork
effects, mainly the information component that is affected by outreach under the ACA’s Medicaid
expansion. I use a novel approach to investigate the effect of information on Medicaid enrollment
of previously-eligible parents. Using data from the American Community Survey (ACS) for the
years 2009-2016, I exploit the ACA’s Medicaid expansion as a natural experiment to capture the
changes in outreach. After controlling for the change in income eligibility limits, woodwork effects
capture the effect of information on Medicaid enrollment in the pre- and post-2014 period. In
addition, I use Google trends data to determine the search volume of Medicaid in expansion and
non-expansion states.
The change in income eligibility limits is referred as the “threshold effect”. Similar to
Hamersma and Kim (2013), the threshold effect is modeled as a continuous measure that
captures the intensive margin of the expansion than an indicator variable for expansion states.
Previous eligibility of parents is computed using a simulated eligibility measure (Currie and
Gruber, 1995, Cutler and Gruber, 1996). This paper differentiates from Frean, Gruber, and
Sommers (2017) on two aspects: i) construction of simulated eligibility and ii) decomposition of
5The authors emphasize that large woodwork effects in their study might be due to measurement errors in
Medicaid eligibility.
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woodwork effects. Frean, Gruber, and Sommers (2017) use income cells to calculate the
proportion of eligible adults at the PUMA level6, whereas I use cells on demographic
characteristics to calculate the proportion of eligible adults at the state level, similar to Currie
and Gruber (1995).7 Most importantly, I disentangle the information component of woodwork
effects, which has not been explored before.
I find that woodwork effects increase Medicaid enrollment after the ACA’s Medicaid expansion
in 2014. Woodwork effects peak in 2015 with a 65.4% increase in Medicaid enrollment. I do not
find any effect prior to the expansion. I capture heterogeneous woodwork effects after stratifying
the sample by education (low-educated or high-educated), ethnicity (Hispanic or Non-Hispanic),
and race (white or non-white).8 The average marginal effects are larger for targeted communities
(minorities and low-educated parents) than non-targeted communities. Low-educated parents
increase Medicaid enrollment by 46%. For all states, the largest effect is on Hispanic parents
(83.9%) when compared to the mean in the pre-ACA period.9 Non-white parents, on the other
hand, increase Medicaid enrollment by 47.1% vis-a`-vis woodwork effects. On average, woodwork
effects are larger in non-expansion states than expansion states. This evidence implies the presence
of information spillovers under the ACA’s Medicaid expansion.
To provide further evidence on the presence of information spillovers, I analyze woodwork
effects based on the search volume of Medicaid using Google trends data. Woodwork effects are
dominant in states with high search volume than states with low search volume. In all states with
high search volume, Medicaid enrollment increases by 51.4%. Non-expansion states experience
an increase in Medicaid enrollment by 79.8% and 37.4% beyond the pre-ACA mean when search
6PUMAs are public use microdata areas within states that have at least 100,000 individuals.
7See also Golberstein and Gonzales (2015) for a recent application of simulated eligibility that use cells on
demographic characteristics.
8See also Garfield et al. (2014) for an analysis of the coverage gap by sociodemographic factors.
9Recent estimates on the uninsured rate released by the Kaiser Family Foundation also show a relatively large
effect on Hispanic populations (Foutz et al., 2017). The data used for the analysis are from the National Health
Interview Survey.
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volume is high and low, respectively. This finding is an important evidence towards information
spillovers in non-expansion states. I do not find a dominating effect of high search volume over low
search volume in expansion states. Woodwork effects in expansion states are likely to be driven
by community-based outreach than the information spillover on the Internet. In addition, the
search volume of the Marketplace (HealthCare.gov) exhibits seasonality due to open enrollment
periods. Although the largest spike occurs in 2014 after the ACA’s Medicaid expansion, search
volume of the Marketplace after 2016 is not negligible.
The remaining part of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 provides background
information on outreach efforts and Medicaid enrollment. Section 3.3 describes the data used
in the study. Section 3.4 introduces the empirical methodology. The findings of the paper are
discussed in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 concludes the analysis.
3.2. Outreach Efforts and Medicaid Enrollment
States had limited outreach efforts to increase Medicaid enrollment prior to the ACA. On April
2010, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) released a report that outlines outreach
activities for both Medicaid and States Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) in 10
states. The report shows that most of the states do not use internet for outreach purposes and
only a small proportion of states use media ads to advertise the program. According to state
officials, the most common outreach strategy is to use toll-free hotlines.10 States also benefit
from earlier campaigns that had significant impact on Medicaid enrollment. For example,
Oregon’s Medicaid flyer campaign in schools or Maryland’s enrollment assistance. Since the
success of Medicaid expansion vis-a`-vis enrollment is strongly linked to outreach efforts, mass
10The funds available for Medicaid and SCHIP are mixed across states and hence outreach strategies differ across
programs.
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marketing campaigns become mainstream. In addition to mass marketing campaigns, the
introduction of health insurance exchanges, improved enrollment assistance via websites, and
using existing data on Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) to determine
eligibility contribute to outreach efforts under the ACA.
Many of the marketing campaigns use a wide range of platforms including TV, radio, social
media, sports events, community partner programs, and faith communities that foster Medicaid
enrollment. In addition, churches, grocery stores, beauty and barber shops are used for
community-based outreach. In Maryland, for example, state officials provide information about
Medicaid enrollment at Safeway and Giant stores. Using local organizations, states focus on
spreading coverage to hard-to-reach communities including minorities and immigrants with
language barriers. The Centers of Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) release Medicaid fact
sheets in multiple languages for both expansion and non-expansion states to increase targeted
outreach (see Appendix, Figure B1). Gates, Stephens, and Artiga (2014), on the other hand,
emphasize the importance of text messages for targeted outreach since more than 90 percent of
American adults owned a cell phone in 2013.11
If previously-eligible individuals enroll for Medicaid due to increased outreach, this is referred
as the “woodwork effect” or “welcome-mat effect” (see, for example, Sommers and Epstein, 2011,
Sonier, Boudreaux, and Blewett, 2013, Frean, Gruber, and Sommers, 2017).12 It is possible to
estimate the effect of information on Medicaid enrollment since parents are eligible for Medicaid
prior to the ACA’s Medicaid expansion. Previous studies on the ACA’s Medicaid expansion focus
on adults without dependent children (“childless adults”) that had no access to coverage before
2014 due to the confounding effects of information on parents’ Medicaid enrollment (see Aslim,
2016, Leung and Mas, 2016, Dague, DeLeire, and Leininger, 2017). This study distinguishes from
11For example, the first free nationwide text messaging service for pregnant women is called “Text4baby”.
12The terms, information effect and woodwork effect, are used interchangeably in the paper.
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previous studies not only by focusing on parents, but also by estimating the effect of outreach on
Medicaid enrollment.
Figure 3.1: Uninsured Rate for Parents, ACS 2009-2016
Using the 2009-2016 American Community Survey (ACS), I define two groups of parents, low-
educated and low-income, who are more likely to be affected by the ACA’s Medicaid expansion
(see Figure 3.1). Low education is defined as having less than or equal to 12 years of education.
Low income, on the other hand, is defined as having an income less than or equal to 200%
FPL. For both groups, there is a sharp decline in the uninsured rate after 2013. The decline in
the uninsured rate coincides with the period of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion. In this paper,
I exploit woodwork effects that may explain the decline in the uninsured rate after 2013. The
enrollment data also have a break point in 2013 (see Appendix, Figure B2). Low-educated parents
and targeted minorities (Hispanic and/or non-white) have higher Medicaid enrollment than their
counterparts.
A similar pattern is also captured by Google trends data. Figure 3.2 shows the search volume of
74
Figure 3.2: Medicaid Search Volume, Google Trends 2007-2016
multiple keywords related to Medicaid. The keywords are: “Medicaid”, “Obamacare”, “Affordable
Care Act”, “ACA”, “Medicaid parent’s insurance”.13 The findings suggest that individuals have
started seeking for information prior to the ACA’s Medicaid expansion. Open enrollment period
had a lot of information spillover vis-a`-vis outreach efforts. The 2014 open enrollment started on
October 1, 2013, which also corresponds to the peak point of search volume data. The enactment
of ACA in 2010 and ex-ante provisions on Medicaid do not have significant effects on the search
volume of Medicaid relative to the ACA’s Medicaid expansion.
3.3. Data
The main data set used in the analysis is the American Community Survey (ACS) for the years
2009 through 2016. The ACS is conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau on a monthly basis by
randomly sampling addresses in each state. The ACS is a replacement of the long-form sample
13The data show mutually exclusive searches of keywords.
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for which the response is required by law.14 The questionnaire is answered by approximately
250,000 housing units each month.15 The ACS provides information on health insurance coverage,
household income, and demographic characteristics by state and year.16 Similar information is
also provided by the March Current Population Survey (March CPS), but the survey had a
change in health insurance questions during the period of ACA’s Medicaid expansion, which may
jeopardize the estimates on Medicaid enrollment. In addition, the sample of parents in March
CPS is much smaller than the ACS.
The sample is restricted to parents using the survey question about the presence of children.
Parents who are in the armed forces are excluded from the analysis due to the possibility of
enrolling for TRICARE. I also exclude parents aged 27 to 64 years from the analysis due to
the confounding effects of the ACA’s dependent coverage mandate and Medicare on Medicaid
enrollment. Late expansion states (AK, MI, NH, PA, IN, MT, and LA) are dropped from the
analysis to avoid any information spillovers that could bias the estimates. I probe the robustness
of the estimates to the inclusion of late expansion states.17
The information on income eligibility limits for parents, defined as a percent of the federal
poverty level (FPL), is obtained from the reports released by the Kaiser Family Foundation
(KFF). All income eligibility limits are released for a family of three and hence per capita income
adjustments has to be made for family sizes greater than three (see Section 3.3.1 for a detailed
discussion). In addition, state rules on eligibility differs for working and jobless parents. The
eligibility measure, introduced in next section, accounts for the differences in income thresholds
vis-a´-vis the employment status of parents.
14The long-form sample was conducted once every 10 years.
15The households can complete the questionnaire either online or as a hard copy.
16Information on survey months is not available in the annual files.
17I do not exclude early expansion states (CT, DE, HI, MN, NY, VT, and DC) from the analysis because the
early expansion mainly targeted adults without dependent children (“childless adults”).
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I use Google trends data on keywords related to Medicaid to supplement the analysis on
information effects (see Section 3.2 for the list of keywords). It is a monthly data covering the
periods between January 2007 and December 2016. The data capture the relative search volume
of a keyword by month and state. It is also possible to retrieve the joint search volume of multiple
keywords. The data points on search volume are adjusted by the total searches in that region
and the period it spans. Repeated searches from an individual over a short period of time are
excluded from the data. Google trends data do not provide information on family structure and
hence it is not possible to restrict the sample to parents. In order to capture some of the searches
from parents, I include a keyword on Medicaid coverage for parents.
3.3.1. Construction of Key Variables
There are two key variables in the model, one that captures the proportion of eligible parents
(“simulated eligibility”), and the other that captures the information effect under the ACA’s
Medicaid expansion. I use these variables to understand the changes in Medicaid enrollment
between 2009 and 2016.
Since income eligibility limits for parents are calculated based on a family of three, I use
per capita (family) income and state poverty guidelines to determine percent FPL for parents
with different family sizes.18 Using percent FPL of parents and state eligibility rules for each
year (138% FPL for most states in 2014), I construct an indicator variable on eligibility for each
parent.19 As will be discussed later in results section, the findings are robust when eligibility is
defined only for a family of three.
Previous studies use simulated eligibility as an instrument for actual Medicaid eligibility to
18Poverty guidelines are obtained from the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, which vary by
household size, year, and state.
19If percent FPL for a parent is less than the state eligibility rule, the measure on eligibility (E) takes the value
1 and 0 otherwise (E = I{FPLparents ≤ 138}).
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address concerns on endogeneity (Currie and Gruber, 1995, Cutler and Gruber, 1996, Gruber
and Simon, 2008, Gross and Notowidigdo, 2011). This study uses simulated eligibility to measure
the effect of outreach on Medicaid enrollment. If previously-eligible parents increase Medicaid
enrollment in post-2014 relative to pre-2014, this would imply the presence of woodwork effects,
where eligible parents take-up Medicaid after increased outreach. I use the following steps to
construct simulated eligibility. First, I randomly select 50 percent of the observations using the
ACS sample for the years 2009-2016 (N = 1, 458, 728). Next, I define cells on state, year, age, sex
(female or male), marital status (married or non-married), race (white or non-white), ethnicity
(Hispanic or Non-Hispanic), number of children (≤ 2 or > 2 children), and education (≤ 12
or > 12 years). Finally, I calculate the proportion of parents eligible for Medicaid using the
combination of cells and previously assigned eligibility.20
Figure 3.3 depicts the changes in simulated eligibility in expansion and non-expansion states
for the pre- and post-2014 period.21 The median simulated eligibility is approximately the same
in non-expansion states for both periods. Since the main effect is in expansion states, there is
an increase in the median simulated eligibility after 2014. The upper and lower adjacent values,
however, are close to each other in expansion states. There are also cases where the proportion of
eligible parents is zero. Since the aim is to have a sample of previously-eligible parents, I exclude
those with zero simulated eligibility. The main analysis includes parents with positive simulated
eligibility. Later, I check the sensitivity of the estimates to the exclusion of outliers by considering
a sample that has simulated eligibility: i) greater than zero and less than the upper adjacent value
(Q3 + 1.5 IQR)
22 or ii) between the 25th and 75th percentile.
20I lose 0.19 percent of the sample (5,656 observations out of 2,911,591) due to insufficient number of observations
in specific cell combinations.
21I suppress outliers on the graph for the sake of comparison.
22Third quartile is defined as Q3, and the interquartile range (IQR) is the difference between the third and first
quartiles.
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Figure 3.3: Simulated Eligibility in Expansion and Non-Expansion States
Another key variable, ∆Limit, is a continuous measure that captures the intensive margin of
Medicaid expansion by taking the difference in income eligibility limits between 2013 and 2014.
Since income eligibility limits differ based on employment status, I distinguish between working
and jobless parents when taking the difference for each state. Hence, ∆Limit varies not only by
state, but also by the employment status of parents. In expansion states, the average change in
income eligibility limits is around 27 percent, which corresponds to a $5,424 change in FPL for a
family of three in 2014. From 2013 to 2014, Arkansas, for example, experienced the largest
change in income eligibility limits by 125 percent for jobless parents.
Table 3.1 provides summary statistics for key variables used in the model. The average
Medicaid enrollment rate increases in all states after the ACA’s Medicaid expansion. Although
the increase is mainly driven by parents in expansion states, there is also an increase in Medicaid
enrollment in non-expansion states. Given that the average change in eligibility limits is negative
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics for Key Variables, ACS 2009-2016
All States Expansion States Non-Expansion States
Pre-2014 Post-2014 Pre-2014 Post-2014 Pre-2014 Post-2014
Medicaid Enrollment 0.104 0.140 0.117 0.170 0.081 0.092
(0.305) (0.347) (0.322) (0.376) (0.273) (0.289)
∆Limit 0.126 0.143 0.217 0.243 -0.022 -0.021
(0.349) (0.359) (0.396) (0.405) (0.172) (0.168)
Simulated Eligibility 0.109 0.126 0.143 0.171 0.053 0.051
(0.089) (0.089) (0.088) (0.076) (0.054) (0.048)
N 1,469,797 885,561 907,352 549,719 562,445 335,842
Notes: All specifications include state and year fixed effects and control variables. The sample includes parents
with positive simulated eligibility (see text for details). Late expansion states (AK, NH, PA, IN, and MT) are
excluded from the analysis. Standard errors are clustered by state and shown in parenthesis. Significance levels
are: ***0.01, **0.05, and *0.10.
in non-expansion states, an increase in Medicaid enrollment implies the presence of an information
spillover. Since the sample is restricted to parents with positive simulated eligibility, the change
in Medicaid enrollment in expansion states, while controlling for the change in income eligibility
limits, could be attributed to increased outreach under the ACA’s Medicaid expansion. The
pattern in average simulated eligibility is consistent with the pattern depicted by Figure 3.3. For
the sample of all states, average simulated eligibility increases in the post-2014 period, which is
mainly driven by the change in income eligibility limits between 2013 and 2014.
3.4. Methods
The empirical strategy is to identify the effect of information (“woodwork effect”) on Medicaid
enrollment by exploiting outreach efforts under the ACA’s Medicaid expansion. Given the sample
on parents with positive simulated eligibility, the following model yields the woodwork effect:
mi(j)st = α0 + α1∆Limiti(j)s + α2∆Limiti(j)s ∗ Postt +X
′
i(j)stΓ + ξs + γt + i(j)st, (3.1)
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where m is Medicaid enrollment for parent i with employment status i(j) in state s and year
t. ∆Limiti(j)s is the change in income eligibility limits between 2013 and 2014. Since income
eligibility limits differ for working and jobless adults, the measure that I create varies by i(j). After
controlling for ∆Limiti(j)s, the difference in Medicaid enrollment for eligible parents between the
pre- and post-2014 period is attributed to woodwork effects, which is captured by ∆Limiti(j)s ∗
Postt. The indicator variable Postt takes the value 1 for the years 2014 through 2016 and 0
otherwise. The proportion of eligible adults in both periods are determined using simulated
eligibility (see Section 3.3.1 for details). Xi(j)st is a vector of individual characteristics including
age, gender, marital status, race, ethnicity, number of children, and educational attainment. State
and year fixed effects are denoted by ξs and γt, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the
state level.
The main assumption of the benchmark model is that there are no information shocks affecting
Medicaid enrollment prior to 2014. In order to verify this assumption, I estimate the following
equation:
mi(j)st = β0 + β1∆Limiti(j)s +
2016∑
t=2010
λt(∆Limiti(j)s ∗ Y eart) +X
′
i(j)stβ2 + ξs + γt + i(j)st,
(3.2)
The key variable of interest is ∆Limitjs ∗ Y eart, which yields the pattern of woodwork effects
between 2010 and 2016. If the ACA’s Medicaid expansion creates woodwork effects, this is
expected to be observed in the post-2014 period. If the pre-existing trend of Medicaid enrollment
do not exhibit any breaks, then the estimates for ∆Limitjs ∗Y eart from 2010 to 2013 should not
be statistically different from zero. This implies that only the estimates for
∑2016
t=2014(∆Limiti(j)s ∗
Y eart) are expected to capture statistically significant changes in Medicaid enrollment.
81
Since minorities23 are targeted under the ACA’s Medicaid expansion, I analyze the changes
in Medicaid enrollment vis-a´-vis woodwork effects by education (low-educated or high-educated),
ethnicity (Hispanic or Non-Hispanic), and race (White or Non-White), and use it as a comparison
to all parents in the sample. If woodwork effects are heterogeneous across parent groups, this
analysis would show the differences in Medicaid enrollment between targeted and non-targeted
parent groups. In addition, I support the analysis on woodwork effects by stratifying the sample
to states with high and low search volume of Medicaid on the Internet. I use Google trends data
to identify the states that had higher search volume of Medicaid prior to the ACA’s Medicaid
expansion in 2014. High (low) search volume is defined as having a search volume greater (less)
than the mean for all states. As a robustness check, I also use the mean search volume prior to
the enactment of ACA in 2010.
3.5. Results
3.5.1. Trends in Medicaid Enrollment
Before presenting the main findings, I first check whether there are any pre-existing trends in
Medicaid enrollment. The benchmark model assumes that in the absence of the ACA’s Medicaid
expansion there are no information shocks affecting Medicaid enrollment. This implies that the
time trend (λt) has to be the same for all states in the pre-2014 period. As discussed earlier,
I exploit the change in income eligibility limits from 2013 to 2014 for a sample of parents with
positive simulated eligibility. If woodwork effects exist, there should be a break in the trend of
Medicaid enrollment after 2013. Table 3.2 presents the time pattern of the changes in Medicaid
enrollment of parents that varies by education, ethnicity, and race.
23Minority groups are defined in terms of race, ethnicity, gender, or religion. In this study, I particularly focus
on Hispanic and/or Non-White parents.
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The results indicate that ∆Limit increases Medicaid enrollment after 2013 for parents with
positive simulated eligibility. This is a supportive evidence on woodwork effects since there are no
effects on Medicaid enrollment prior to the ACA’s Medicaid expansion. This finding is intuitive
given the fact that outreach efforts were limited in the pre-2014 period. The increase in Medicaid
enrollment is larger for targeted communities (minorities and low-educated parents) than non-
targeted communities. The average marginal effect peaks in 2015 and slightly declines after for
all parents. This is consistent with the Medicaid enrollment pattern observed in Figure B2. In
2014, Medicaid enrollment increases for all parents by 4 percentage points. This corresponds to a
38.5% increase in Medicaid enrollment relative to the mean in pre-2014. The increase in Medicaid
enrollment almost doubles in 2015 with an increase of 65.4% relative to the mean in pre-2014.
Table 3.2: Trends in Medicaid Enrollment
Education Ethnicity Race
All Low-Educated High-Educated Hispanic Non-Hispanic White Non-White
Parents Parents Parents Parents Parents Parents Parents
∆Limit*2010 0.001 -0.002 0.003 0.006 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.008) (0.003) (0.010) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008)
∆Limit*2011 -0.003 -0.009 -0.0002 0.014 -0.004 -0.003 -0.001
(0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.010) (0.005) (0.004) (0.010)
∆Limit*2012 0.002 -0.005 0.004 -0.001 0.002 0.002 -0.002
(0.005) (0.009) (0.004) (0.013) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008)
∆Limit*2013 0.005 -0.001 0.009** 0.005 0.005 0.007 -0.007
(0.006) (0.008) (0.004) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010)
∆Limit*2014 0.040*** 0.047*** 0.034*** 0.087*** 0.036*** 0.039*** 0.046***
(0.009) (0.014) (0.007) (0.023) (0.008) (0.008) (0.018)
∆Limit*2015 0.068*** 0.092*** 0.051*** 0.134*** 0.063*** 0.065*** 0.089***
(0.015) (0.022) (0.010) (0.043) (0.011) (0.013) (0.026)
∆Limit*2016 0.067*** 0.091*** 0.050*** 0.134*** 0.061*** 0.065*** 0.081***
(0.015) (0.023) (0.010) (0.042) (0.011) (0.012) (0.028)
N 2,355,358 825,032 1,530,326 311,892 2,043,466 1,849,363 505,995
Notes: All specifications include state and year fixed effects and control variables. The sample includes parents with positive simulated
eligibility (see text for details). Late expansion states (AK, MI, NH, PA, IN, MT, and LA) are excluded from the analysis. Coefficients
are average marginal effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by state. Significance levels are: ***0.01, **0.05, and
*0.10.
Although the increase in Medicaid enrollment is statistically significant in 2013 for
high-educated parents, the effect is very small in magnitude compared to the post-2014 period.
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Medicaid enrollment of high-educated parents increases by 14.5% and 54.8% in 2013 and 2014,
respectively. The increase in Medicaid enrollment is largest for Hispanic parents with a 63.5%
increase in 2014. In terms of education and race, the woodwork effect increases Medicaid
enrollment of low-educated (27%)and non-white (29.3%) parents, but the percent increase in
larger for high-educated (54.8%) and non-white parents (29.3%) in 2014. The average marginal
effect is higher for socially disadvantaged groups, but the percent change is lower for
low-educated and non-white parents due to the high mean value of Medicaid enrollment in the
post-2014 period.
3.5.2. Medicaid Enrollment and Woodwork Effects
This subsection complements the analysis above by introducing the benchmark findings on
woodwork effects. I analyze woodwork effects separately for expansion and non-expansion
states, and compare the findings to all states. I present the estimates for two key variables in
the model, ∆Limit and ∆Limit*Post, where the former captures the change in the pool of
eligible parents resulting from the change in income eligibility limits and the latter captures
woodwork effects by comparing the changes in Medicaid enrollment in the pre- and post-2014
period for parents with positive simulated eligibility. The reason for using positive simulated
eligibility is to include parents who are likely to be eligible in the post-2014 period, but do not
take-up Medicaid.
Table 3.3 presents the findings on the changes in Medicaid enrollment vis-a`-vis woodwork
effects in all states. I stratify the sample by education (low-educated or high-educated), ethnicity
(Hispanic or Non-Hispanic), and race (white or non-white) to capture the heterogeneous effect of
information on targeted communities. ∆Limit is the intensive margin of Medicaid expansion and
it affects the proportion of eligible adults. I refer to the effect of ∆Limit on Medicaid enrollment
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as the “threshold effect” in 2014. After controlling for the threshold effect, the changes in the pre-
and post-2014 period shows the effect of information on Medicaid enrollment. Thus, woodwork
effects would correspond to the information effect under the ACA’s Medicaid expansion.
Table 3.3: Medicaid Enrollment and Woodwork Effects, All States
Education Ethnicity Race
All Low-Educated High-Educated Hispanic Non-Hispanic White Non-White
Parents Parents Parents Parents Parents Parents Parents
∆Limit 0.545*** 0.681*** 0.447*** 0.521*** 0.534*** 0.510*** 0.705***
(0.074) (0.096) (0.021) (0.133) (0.068) (0.065) (0.118)
∆Limit*Post 0.058*** 0.080*** 0.042*** 0.115*** 0.053*** 0.055*** 0.074***
(0.011) (0.017) (0.008) (0.033) (0.009) (0.010) (0.020)
N 2,355,358 825,032 1,530,326 311,892 2,043,466 1,849,363 505,995
Notes: All specifications include state and year fixed effects and control variables. The sample includes parents with positive simulated
eligibility (see text for details). Late expansion states (AK, MI, NH, PA, IN, MT, and LA) are excluded from the analysis. Coefficients
are average marginal effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by state. Significance levels are: ***0.01, **0.05, and
*0.10.
First, I focus on the analysis for all states. Woodwork effects increase Medicaid enrollment by
5.8 percentage points for all parents. This corresponds to a 55.8% increase in Medicaid enrollment
relative to the mean in the pre-2014 period. Woodwork effects are stronger in targeted groups
(minorities and low-educated parents), but the percent changes vary depending on the pre-2014
mean. The increase in Medicaid enrollment is 46% and 53% for low-educated and high-educated
parents, respectively. A group that is mainly targeted through outreach under the ACA’s Medicaid
expansion is Hispanic parents (See Figure B1 for Medicaid Fact Sheets in Spanish). In all parent
groups, the largest change in Medicaid enrollment is for Hispanic parents. Woodwork effects
increase Medicaid enrollment by 11.5 and 5.2 percentage points for Hispanic and non-Hispanic
parents, which corresponds to a 83.9% and 54.6% increase in Medicaid enrollment, respectively. In
terms of race, the estimate for non-White parents is larger than White parents, but percentage-
wise it is the opposite. On one hand, the increase in Medicaid enrollment is 63.2% for White
parents. On the other hand, the increase in Medicaid enrollment is 47.1% for non-White parents.
In expansion states, there is a similar pattern across targeted parent groups. Woodwork effects
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Table 3.4: Medicaid Enrollment and Woodwork Effects, Expansion States
Education Ethnicity Race
All Low-Educated High-Educated Hispanic Non-Hispanic White Non-White
Parents Parents Parents Parents Parents Parents Parents
∆Limit 0.666*** 0.840*** 0.558*** 0.645* 0.652*** 0.627*** 0.868**
(0.181) (0.234) (0.143) (0.328) (0.157) (0.152) (0.339)
∆Limit*Post 0.042*** 0.053*** 0.033*** 0.071*** 0.041*** 0.044*** 0.047***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.005) (0.018) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009)
N 1,457,071 503,402 953,669 208,333 1,248,738 1,123,346 333,725
Notes: All specifications include state and year fixed effects and control variables. The sample includes parents with positive simulated
eligibility (see text for details). There are 26 expansion states in the sample. Late expansion states (AK, MI, NH, PA, IN, MT, and
LA) are excluded from the analysis. Coefficients are average marginal effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by
state. Significance levels are: ***0.01, **0.05, and *0.10.
have a large impact on socioeconomically disadvantaged groups. Low-educated parents increase
their Medicaid enrollment by 26.8% relative to the mean in the pre-2014 period. The effect of
information is still very high for Hispanic parents such that Medicaid enrollment increases by
43.3%. For non-white parents, the increase in Medicaid enrollment is 27.2%. When all parents
are taken into account, the change in Medicaid enrollment is computed as 35.9%. These findings
suggest that previously-eligible parents in expansion states are more inclined to take-up Medicaid
after the ACA’s Medicaid expansion.
Table 3.5: Medicaid Enrollment and Woodwork Effects, Non-Expansion States
Education Ethnicity Race
All Low-Educated High-Educated Hispanic Non-Hispanic White Non-White
Parents Parents Parents Parents Parents Parents Parents
∆Limit 0.519*** 0.637*** 0.397*** 0.534*** 0.508** 0.476*** 0.691***
(0.066) (0.088) (0.048) (0.110) (0.065) (0.057) (0.099)
∆Limit*Post 0.045*** 0.070*** 0.027** 0.010 0.048*** 0.043*** 0.041**
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.016)
N 898,287 321,630 576,657 103,559 794,728 726,017 172,270
Notes: All specifications include state and year fixed effects and control variables. The sample includes parents with positive simulated
eligibility (see text for details). There are 18 non-expansion states in the sample. Exclusion of late expansion states (AK, MI, NH,
PA, IN, MT, and LA) do not affect the analysis for non-expansion states. Coefficients are average marginal effects. Robust standard
errors in parentheses are clustered by state. Significance levels are: ***0.01, **0.05, and *0.10.
In order to strengthen the findings on woodwork effects, I focus on non-expansion states that
had limited changes in income eligibility limits (see Table 3.5). In fact, the average change in
income eligibility limits is around -0.22 from 2013 to 2014. Although there is a negative shock in
non-expansion states with respect to ∆Limit, there is still an increase in Medicaid enrollment.
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All parents increase Medicaid enrollment by 55.5%, despite the fact that average ∆Limit is
negative. This finding implies that woodwork effects are stronger in non-expansion states than
expansion states for all parents. The average marginal effects are still high for socioeconomically
disadvantaged groups. I find that low-educated parents increase their Medicaid enrollment by
51.1%. Contrary to the finding in expansion states, I do not observe a statistical significant
change in Medicaid enrollment for Hispanic parents in non-expansion states. This finding is very
interesting because a group that is mainly targeted in expansion states through outreach is not
affected in non-expansion states. Non-Hispanic parents, however, increase Medicaid enrollment
by 59.3%. For non-white parents, the increase in Medicaid enrollment is estimated to be 37%.
These findings altogether imply that previously-eligible parents in non-expansion states are
affected by the information spillover under the ACA’s Medicaid expansion.
3.5.3. More Evidence on Woodwork Effects
I provide additional analysis using Google trends data to support the findings on woodwork effects.
Since the Internet provides easy access to information, it is exploited under the ACA’s Medicaid
expansion for outreach purposes.24 The Google trends data vary by month, year, and state. I
aggregate the data by state and year to be able to merge it to the ACS. The distribution of
the aggregated data is provided in Figure B3. In the pre-2014 period, the mean search volume
of Medicaid is 22.46. In the post-2014 period, however, the mean search volume of Medicaid
increases to 28.86. The increase in search volume after the ACA’s Medicaid expansion implies
that woodwork effects are not only driven by community-based outreach, but also through the
Internet that creates information spillovers between states.
Table 3.6 shows how Medicaid enrollment of all parents change in states with high and low
24The Current Population Survey (CPS) shows that 75 percent of households have access to the Internet at
home in 2012.
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search volume of Medicaid. If search volume in a state is at least 22.46, the pre-2014 mean,
it is defined as high search volume, and below that threshold is defined as low search volume.
The findings imply that woodwork effects increase Medicaid enrollment in all states, but more so
in non-expansion states with high search volume. Medicaid enrollment in non-expansion states
increase by 6.7 percentage points. This corresponds to an increase in Medicaid enrollment by
79.8% beyond the mean in the pre-2014 period. The increase in Medicaid enrollment is 37.4%
in non-expansion states with low search volume. Since expansion states have community-based
outreach, there is no information spillover as in the case of non-expansion states. The estimates
imply that community-based outreach dampens the effect of search volume. On the other hand,
when expansion and non-expansion states are combined, woodwork effects are dominant in states
with high search volume (51.4% increase) than states with low search volume (44.1% increase).
Table 3.6: Medicaid Enrollment and Woodwork Effects, Search Volume (Pre-2014)
All States Expansion States Non-Expansion States
∆Limit 0.509*** 0.619*** 0.411*** 1.145* 0.573*** 0.411***
(0.069) (0.187) (0.102) (0.544) (0.101) (0.050)
∆Limit*Post 0.055*** 0.056*** 0.030** 0.053*** 0.067*** 0.034***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.008)
High Search Volume Y N Y N Y N
Low Search Volume N Y N Y N Y
N 1,095,530 1,259,282 383,433 1,073,638 712,097 186,190
Notes: All specifications include state and year fixed effects and control variables. High and low search volumes
are based on the pre-2014 mean value. The sample includes parents with positive simulated eligibility (see text for
details). Late expansion states (AK, MI, NH, PA, IN, MT, and LA) are excluded from the analysis. Coefficients
are average marginal effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by state. Significance levels
are: ***0.01, **0.05, and *0.10.
In addition, I analyze the search volume of “HealthCare.gov”, the new health insurance
exchange (or the Marketplace) under the ACA (see Appendix, Figure B4). Since the website has
launched on October 1, 2013, I do not include data prior to 2013. There is seasonality in search
volume due to open enrollment periods. The spike in search volume is between October and
March each year. The year of ACA’s Medicaid expansion, 2014, has had the highest search
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volume of the Marketplace. The spike in 2017 is also higher than the preceding years, 2016 and
2015. This spike in search volume is in late 2016, after the U.S. presidential election and before
the last day of enrollment for plans that start in January 2017. Since the election campaigns in
2016 focused largely on the ACA, it might have triggered woodwork effects. It would be
interesting to explore the relationship between elections and woodwork effects in the future.
3.5.4. Robustness Checks
In this subsection I investigate the robustness of woodwork effects to alternative specifications.
The main analysis excludes late expansion states (AK, MI, NH, PA, IN, MT, and LA) due to
information spillovers between states in 2014. In addition, state eligibility limits provided by
the Kaiser Family Foundation are for family of three. I use per capita family income to assign
eligibility to parents with different family sizes. In order to check whether the estimates are
sensitive to the selection of states and family size, I include late expansion states in the analysis
and keep parents with family of three in the benchmark sample that excludes late expansion states
(see Table 3.7). The inclusion of late expansion states in the specification for parents with family
of three does not alter the findings.25
Table 3.7 shows that woodwork effects are fairly robust across specifications. Medicaid
enrollment increases by 45.3% and 50.9% when late expansion states are included and family
size is restricted to three, respectively. These estimates are comparable to the benchmark
estimate that shows a 55.8% increase in Medicaid enrollment. Woodwork effects are stronger in
non-expansion states than expansion states for all parents. This finding on woodwork effects is
consistent with the analysis above. The inclusion of late expansion states does not affect
non-expansion states, and hence the estimates are the same as the benchmark estimates.
25The estimates for this case are available from the author upon request.
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Table 3.7: Medicaid Enrollment and Woodwork Effects, Inclusion of Late Expansion States and Family of
Three
All States Expansion States Non-Expansion States
∆Limit 0.575*** 0.555*** 0.680*** 0.675*** 0.519*** 0.526***
(0.069) (0.075) (0.116) (0.173) (0.066) (0.071)
∆Limit*Post 0.053*** 0.059*** 0.041*** 0.043*** 0.045*** 0.050***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.007) (0.006) (0.011) (0.015)
Late Expansion States Y N Y N Y N
Family of Three N Y N Y N Y
N 2,652,334 703,249 1,754,047 428,515 898,287 274,734
Notes: All specifications include state and year fixed effects and control variables. The sample includes parents
with positive simulated eligibility (see text for details). Late expansion states are AK, MI, NH, PA, IN, MT,
and LA. Coefficients are average marginal effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by state.
Significance levels are: ***0.01, **0.05, and *0.10.
The second set of robustness checks are on the selection of samples based on simulated
eligibility. Since the proportion of eligible adults changes in the post-2014 period, I select
samples that are comparable in terms of simulated eligibility in both pre- and post-2014. I use
Figure 3.3 provided in Section 3.3.1 to select samples that overlap vis-a`-vis simulated eligibility.
Sample 1 includes parents with simulated eligibility greater than zero and less than the upper
adjacent value. The upper adjacent value is obtained by Q3 + 1.5 IQR, where Q3 is the third
quartile and interquartile range (IQR) is the difference between the third and first quartiles.
Sample 2 includes a smaller of parents with simulated eligibility in between the first quartile and
third quartile. Using both samples show whether the estimates on woodwork effects are sensitive
to different proportions of simulated eligibility.
Table 3.8 presents findings based on different samples of simulated eligibility. The average
marginal effects are close in magnitude to the benchmark estimates, but the percentage changes
vary depending on the pre-2014 mean of Medicaid enrollment. The increase in Medicaid
enrollment in both samples ranges between 64% and 71% for all states. The percent changes are
higher relative to the benchmark analysis given the exclusion of outliers that lower mean
simulated eligibility and Medicaid enrollment. The findings are robust across specifications such
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Table 3.8: Medicaid Enrollment and Woodwork Effects, Different Samples of Simulated Eligibility
All States Expansion States Non-Expansion States
∆Limit 0.547*** 0.519*** 0.667*** 0.728*** 0.528*** 0.538***
(0.075) (0.068) (0.184) (0.238) (0.081) (0.105)
∆Limit*Post 0.056*** 0.053*** 0.041*** 0.045*** 0.051** 0.049***
(0.012) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.018) (0.022)
Sample 1† Y N Y N Y N
Sample 2‡ N Y N Y N Y
N 2,299,827 1,186,502 1,415,713 786,466 843,001 577,735
Notes: All specifications include state and year fixed effects and control variables. †Sample 1 includes
parents with simulated eligibility greater than zero and less than the upper limit of box plot (Q3 + 1.5
IQR). ‡Sample 2 includes parents with simulated eligibility in between the first and third quartile (Q1
and Q3). Late expansion states (AK, MI, NH, PA, IN, MT, and LA) are excluded from the analysis.
Coefficients are average marginal effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by state.
Significance levels are: ***0.01, **0.05, and *0.10.
that Medicaid enrollment is higher in non-expansion states (64-68%) than expansion states
(41-50%).
The final robustness check is on the selection of high and low search volume states. The
benchmark analysis uses the period between 2009 and 2014 to determine the search volume of
Medicaid. Figure 3.2 in Section 3.2 shows spikes in the search volume of Medicaid between 2012
and 2013. Increased outreach during the open enrollment period in 2013 is likely to be driving the
search volume of Medicaid. I test whether using a more stable period in terms of outreach, the
pre-ACA period (2007-2009), alter the results on Medicaid enrollment. I determine low and high
search volume states using the mean search volume in the pre-ACA period. States with search
volume greater or equal to 12.81 are coded as high search volume states and those below 12.81
are coded as low search volume states.
The findings on Table 3.9 show that the estimates are not sensitive to the selection of states
based on the search volume of Medicaid in the pre-2010 period. The largest impact is in non-
expansion states with high search volume of Medicaid. The increase in Medicaid enrollment
is 79.8% in non-expansion states with high search volume of Medicaid. Increased outreach in
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Table 3.9: Medicaid Enrollment and Woodwork Effects, Search Volume (Pre-2010)
All States Expansion States Non-Expansion States
∆Limit 0.519*** 0.595*** 0.453*** 1.075* 0.571*** 0.415***
(0.073) (0.175) (0.124) (0.506) (0.100) (0.052)
∆Limit*Post 0.057*** 0.056*** 0.030** 0.054*** 0.067*** 0.034***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.010) (0.012) (0.015) (0.008)
High Search Volume Y N Y N Y N
Low Search Volume N Y N Y N Y
N 1,185,186 1,170,172 484,685 972,386 700,501 197,786
Notes: All specifications include state and year fixed effects and control variables. High and low search
volumes are based on the pre-2010 mean value. The sample includes parents with positive simulated eligibility
(see text for details). Late expansion states (AK, MI, NH, PA, IN, MT, and LA) are excluded from the
analysis. Coefficients are average marginal effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by
state. Significance levels are: ***0.01, **0.05, and *0.10.
expansion states dampens the effect of search volume on Medicaid enrollment such that the
increase in Medicaid enrollment is higher in low search volume states than high search volume
states. The overall finding for all states, however, suggests that woodwork effects are stronger in
high search volume states, where Medicaid enrollment increases by 51.8%.
3.6. Conclusion
This study analyzes one of the most debated provisions of the ACA, the Medicaid expansion
in 2014, vis-a`-vis outreach efforts. In 2013, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)
awarded $67 million to fund navigator programs. Navigators are individuals or organizations that
educate the public about the Marketplace and provide in-person enrollment assistance. Navigators
are part of the outreach efforts under the ACA’s Medicaid expansion. Since outreach is increased
with the expansion in 2014, there may be information spillovers about the program across states.
This study uses a novel approach to understand the effect of information on Medicaid enrollment
of previously-eligible adults (“woodwork effect”). I exploit the ACA’s Medicaid expansion as
a natural experiment to investigate whether the increase in outreach after 2013 increases the
enrollment among parents who were eligible before the expansion, but did not take-up Medicaid. If
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changes in eligibility limits are controlled in the model (“threshold effect”), any possible woodwork
effects will be driven from the spread of information through outreach.
This paper shows that woodwork effects are present in all states, but heterogeneous among
parents with different education levels (low-education or high-education), ethnicity (Hispanic or
Non-Hispanic) and race (white or non-white). Woodwork effects are stronger in targeted
populations including low-educated, Hispanic, and non-white parents. In expansion states,
Hispanic parents experience the largest increase in Medicaid enrollment by 43.3%. In addition,
parents in non-expansion states increase Medicaid enrollment after the ACA’s Medicaid
expansion. For all parents, the increase in Medicaid enrollment is 35.9% and 55.5% in expansion
and non-expansion states, respectively.
In order to provide more evidence on woodwork effects, I use Google trends data to stratify the
sample with respect to the search volume of Medicaid. Woodwork effects are higher in magnitude
for all states with high search volume of Medicaid. In states with high and low search volume,
Medicaid enrollment increases by 51.4% and 44.1%, respectively, beyond the mean in the pre-
2014 period. On one hand, community-based outreach dampens the effect of search volume in
expansion states. On the other hand, non-expansion states with high search volume experience
strong woodwork effects. Overall, these findings imply that outreach not only increase Medicaid
enrollment among hard-to-reach communities, but also have spillover effects in non-expansion
states.
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Appendix A
First appendix chapter
Figure A1: Medicaid and CHIP Enrollment Growth Rate
Notes: The graph is constructed by the author using the Medicaid enrollment
data from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS).
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Figure A2: Medicaid Enrollment Growth Rate
Notes: The graph is constructed by the author using the Medicaid enrollment data from the
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS).
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Appendix B
Second appendix chapter
Looking for Health 
Insurance that Fits 
Your Health Needs 
and Your Budget? 
Medicaid or CHIP  
May Be the Answer! 
You Can Enroll Any Time—But Why Wait? 
Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(CHIP) offer low-cost or free health insurance for you and 
your family. 
Who may be eligible? 
• 	 Children and teens up to age 19 
• 	 Parents 
• 	 Pregnant women 
• 	 People with disabilities 
• 	 Youth “aging out” of foster care 
• 	 U.S. citizens and certain lawfully present  
immigrants may be eligible 
Eligibility depends on your income, the number of people 
in your family and the rules in your state. 
Even if you were turned down in the past, you may qualify 
now! 
When you enroll, you can get: 
• 	 Doctor visits 
• 	 Hospital stays 
•	  Preventive care, such as immunizations,  
mammograms & colonoscopy 
• 	 Prenatal and maternity care 
• 	 Mental health care 
•	  Needed medications 
•	  Children get vision and dental care  
(adults may get these benefits too) 
To find out if you qualify, visit HealthCare.gov or call  
1-800-318-2596 (TTY: 1-855-889-4325) for help applying. 
CMS Product No. 11801 
June 2016 
English Flyer
Figure B1: Medicaid Fact Sheets
Source: Centers of Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)
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CMS Product No. 11823-S
June 2016
¿Busca un seguro médico 
que se adapte a sus 
necesidades de salud y su 
presupuesto?
¡Medicaid o CHIP puede ser  
su solución!
Usted puede inscribirse en cualquier 
momento. ¿Por qué esperar?
Medicaid y el Programa de Seguro Médico para Niños 
(CHIP) le ofrecen seguro médico gratis o a bajo costo para 
usted y su familia. 
¿Quién puede ser elegible?
• Niños y jóvenes hasta la edad de 19 años 
• Padres 
• Mujeres embarazadas
• Personas incapacitadas
• Jóvenes que ya no tienen edad para estar bajo el  
cuidado adoptivo temporal (“Foster Care”) 
• Ciudadanos de los Estados Unidos y ciertos inmigrantes 
legalmente presentes en el país podrían ser elegibles 
La elegibilidad depende de su ingreso, del número de 
miembros de su familia y de las leyes de su estado. 
¡Incluso si usted fue rechazado en el pasado, tal vez sea 
elegible ahora!
Cuando se inscriba, podrá obtener cobertura de: 
• Visitas médicas
• Estadías en el hospital  
• Servicios preventivos como vacunas,   
mamografías y colonoscopías 
• Cuidado prenatal y servicios de maternidad
• Cuidado de la salud mental 
• Medicamentos necesarios
• Los niños reciben servicios de visión y dental  
(los adultos también podrían recibirlos) 
Visite CuidadoDeSalud.gov o llame al 
1-800-318-2596 (TTY: 1-855-889-4325) para más 
información sobre la cobertura de salud a bajo costo 
para su familia.
Spanish Flyer
Figure B1: Medicaid Fact Sheets
Source: Centers of Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)
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Figure B2: Medicaid Enrollment by Education, Ethnicity, and Race, ACS 2009-2016
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Figure B3: Medicaid Search Volume in the Pre-2014 and Post-2014 Period
Figure B4: Search volume of HealthCare.gov
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